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Zusammenfassung 
Systeme zur Zertifizierung ökologischer Produktion (im Folgenden Öko-Kontrollsysteme 
genannt) sind die notwendige Voraussetzung für die Existenz eines großräumigen 
Marktes für ökologische Lebensmittel. Trotz eines etablierten und im Allgemeinen 
wirksamen Kontrollsystems kommt es regelmäßig zur Aufdeckung von Betrugsfällen, die 
der Öko-Kontrolle entgangen sind. Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation besteht aus 
vier Artikeln, die aktuelle Fragestellungen behandeln, wie Öko-Kontrollsysteme 
verbessert werden können.  
Einleitend wird anhand eines spieltheoretischen Modells die Notwendigkeit für die 
staatliche Überwachung eines Kontrollsystems, das auf privaten Kontrollstellen basiert, 
aufgezeigt. Die Kontrollergebnisse möglicherweise beeinflussende Faktoren werden 
systematisch dargestellt. Auf dieser Basis werden deutsche Daten, die zur Überwachung 
des Systems in den Jahren 2006 bis 2008 erhoben wurden, statistisch untersucht. Diese 
Untersuchung zeigt, dass es zwischen Kontrollstellen signifikante Unterschiede 
hinsichtlich der ausgesprochenen schweren Sanktionen, d.h. wesentlicher 
Kontrollergebnisse gibt. Die Daten zur Überwachung des Systems können jedoch nicht 
zur weiteren Analyse der Ursachen dieser Unterschiede beitragen. Dieses Manko 
resultiert aus der Unzulänglichkeit der erhobenen Daten: für die Erhebung wesentliche 
Begriffe sind nicht definiert und die Definition von Merkmalen scheint sich im 
Zeitverlauf zu ändern. Die Analyse zeigt, dass detailliertere und verlässlichere Daten 
erforderlich sind, um die Bestimmungsgrößen für die Nichteinhaltung von Öko-Standards 
besser zu verstehen.  
Detaillierte Daten der Öko-Kontrolle landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe wurden von zwei 
Kontrollstellen für die Jahre 2007 bis 2009 zur Verfügung gestellt. Hypothesen zu 
Faktoren, die die Nichteinhaltung des Öko-Standards beeinflussen können, werden mit 
Hilfe des Ansatzes der „Economics of Crime“ abgeleitet. Die Daten von jeweils einer 
Kontrollstelle aus Deutschland und der Schweiz werden mittels ökonometrischer Modelle 
untersucht. Zur Analyse werden zwei unterschiedliche logistische Regressionsmodelle 
herangezogen. Mit diesen Modellen wird unter Verwendung der Daten zur Betriebs- und 
Produktionsstruktur auf einzelbetrieblicher Ebene die Sanktionswahrscheinlichkeit 
geschätzt, die als Proxy-Variable für die Nichteinhaltung des jeweiligen Öko-Standards 
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genutzt wird. Dieser Ansatz zur Bestimmung von Faktoren, die die Nichteinhaltung 
beeinflussen, wurde bisher in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur noch nicht verwendet.  
Die Daten der deutschen Kontrollstelle beinhalten abgestufte Sanktionen. Daher werden 
diese mittels eines ordinalen logistischen Regressionsmodells analysiert. Zur Analyse der 
schweizerischen Kontroll-Daten wird ein logistisches Random-Effects-Panelmodell 
verwendet. Beide Modelle bestätigen einige der bislang in der Praxis zur Analyse des 
Risikos der Nichteinhaltung benutzten Kriterien. Die Kontrollergebnisse der Vorjahre, die 
Komplexität der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe insgesamt sowie die 
tierproduktionstechnischen Herausforderungen als auch die Betriebsgröße erhöhen die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Sanktionierung. Ein mit besonderen Frucht- oder Tierarten 
verknüpftes Risiko, das sich z.B. aus besonderen Ansprüchen eines bestimmten 
Produktionsverfahrens ableiten ließe, kann über die Modelle hinweg nicht festgestellt 
werden. Der nicht völlig zufriedenstellende Erklärungsgehalt beider Modellansätze legt 
nahe, zukünftig Variablen zu berücksichtigen, die bisher nicht erhoben wurden. 
Insbesondere persönliche Eigenschaften des Betriebsleiters oder Daten zur finanziellen 
Lage des Betriebs bzw. des Betriebsleiters könnten den Erklärungsgehalt erhöhen.  
Das heuristische Modell baut auf den ökonometrischen Modellen auf. Dieses Modell 
untersucht das Kontrollsystem aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht, da es die Kosten der 
Kontrolle gemeinsam mit den Schäden der Nichteinhaltung eines Öko-Standards 
berücksichtigt. Die Zusammenhänge zwischen relevanten Bestimmungsgrößen werden 
mittels Monte-Carlo-Simulationen beleuchtet, um Rückschlüsse zur Optimierung des 
Kontrollsystems zu ermöglichen. Diese Simulationen zeigen, dass selbst ohne Geldbußen 
ein Zustand eintreten kann, bei dem ein Großteil der Farmer den Standard einhält.  
Die zur Analyse verwendeten Ansätze sind jeweils mit typischen, den Kontrolldaten 
anhaftenden Schwierigkeiten verbunden. Dazu gehören die Dunkelziffer der 
unentdeckten Nichteinhaltung, unterschiedliche Aufdeckungswahrscheinlichkeiten (z.B. 
zwischen unterschiedlichen Produktionsverfahren) sowie ein möglicher positiver 
Bestätigungsfehler, der aus der Anwendung von risikobasierten Kontrollansätzen 
resultieren kann. Die dieser Arbeit zugrunde liegende Arbeitshypothese, dass diese 
möglichen Verzerrungen jeweils zufällig verteilt sind, sollte in zukünftigen 
Untersuchungen näher erforscht werden.  
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Solch zukünftige Studien sollten auf der Basis noch differenzierterer Daten durchgeführt 
werden. Dazu könnten beispielsweise die Daten mehrerer Kontrollstellen in einem 
Datensatz zusammengeführt werden. Eine breitere Datengrundlage könnte auch die 
verlässliche Analyse schwerer Nichteinhaltungen ermöglichen, die selten vorkommen. 
Überdies würde es solch ein Datensatz erlauben, für die Überwachung des 
Kontrollsystems wesentliche Fragestellungen zu überprüfen. Dazu gehört zum Beispiel 
die Existenz eines Kontrollstelleneffektes auf die Kontrollergebnisse.  
Diese Arbeit präsentiert wichtige Ergebnisse, die für zukünftige Analysen von Öko-
Kontrollsystemen herangezogen werden können. Darüber hinaus sind der vorgestellte 
Ansatz, die angewandten Methoden sowie die Erkenntnisse von generellem Interesse für 
Zertifizierungssysteme auch außerhalb des Bereichs ökologisch hergestellter 
Lebensmittel.  
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Summary 
Organic certification systems are prerequisite for the existence of a large-scale organic 
food market. Despite a well-established and generally effective control system, fraud 
regarding organic food that passed organic controls is detected regularly. This cumulative 
thesis consisting of four articles addresses current questions regarding the improvement 
of organic certification systems.  
The need for governmental supervision of an organic certification system run by private 
control bodies is demonstrated by a game theoretic model. A framework prepares the 
statistical analysis by conceptually linking factors that can influence organic control 
results. The case study on German supervision data from the years 2006 to 2008 reveals 
significant differences between private control bodies regarding the number of severe 
sanctions imposed, i.e. fundamental control results. These data that were collected for 
supervision of the control system, however, are not sufficient to explain these differences. 
This is due to shortcomings in the data collected. Key terms of the data are not defined 
and the variable definitions seem to change over time. This study concludes that there is 
more detailed and reliable data from organic control bodies needed to understand the 
determinants of non-compliance with an organic standard.  
Detailed data on organic farm controls from the years 2007 to 2009 were supplied by two 
control bodies. Theoretical considerations founded on the “Economics of Crime” 
approach yield hypotheses on factors affecting non-compliance with an organic standard. 
The data provided by a German and a Swiss control body are analysed by two different 
logistic regression models. The probability of receiving a sanction (which is used as 
proxy for non-compliance) is estimated on farm level by using data on farm and farm 
production. Such an approach to assess the determinants of non-compliance has not been 
used previously in the literature.  
Given the gradual sanction system, an ordinal logistic regression model is appropriate for 
the analysis of the German data. Swiss data are analysed by a random effects logistic 
regression model. Both models confirm some of the factors contributing to the risk of 
non-compliance that are applied in qualitative risk assessment so far. Control results from 
previous years, the overall farm complexity and the farm livestock production 
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complexity, as well as farm size are factors that increase the probability of receiving a 
sanction. Risks connected to specific crops or livestock types that could come along, e.g., 
with particular requirements of the production method cannot be confirmed across the 
models. The explanatory value of both models is likely to be improved by the integration 
of further variables, such as data on farmers’ personal and financial characteristics.  
The heuristic model builds on the results of the econometric models. This model adopts a 
societal view on the control system by considering the costs of controls and the damages 
resulting from non-compliance with an organic standard. Monte-Carlo simulations 
illustrate the relationship between important parameters for optimising control strategies. 
These simulations show that even without fines a situation can occur where most 
operators comply.  
The different approaches to analyse control data encounter difficulties inherent to the 
control data. In this context, the dark figure consisting of undetected non-compliances, 
inhomogeneous detection probabilities linked to particular production methods, and a 
potential positive confirmation bias connected to the risk based control approach are 
especially relevant. The working hypothesis that these potential biases are distributed 
randomly deserves closer attention in subsequent studies.  
Such future analysis should be based on even more detailed data, e.g., pooling original 
data from different control bodies in a control system. Such a data base would allow 
focusing on severe non-compliances which occur only rarely. Furthermore, pooled data 
could be used to investigate issues that are fundamental for the supervision of a control 
system such as a control body effect on the detection of non-compliance.  
This thesis presents important results that can be consulted for further analysis of organic 
control systems. Beyond, the approach, the methods used, and the results obtained are of 
general relevance for food certification systems beyond the organic sector.  
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1 Introduction  
Certification systems today are widespread in the agricultural sector. Thus, information 
on products and production processes is provided to business partners and consumers: 
certification systems can make invisible attributes of food visible.  
The European organic farming sector is continuously growing (European Commission - 
DG Agri, 2010). The growth of the organic market depends on a credible organic control 
system which is a basic requirement for a separate organic market (Dabbert et al., 2004). 
The managerial and financial charges (“bureaucracy”) of the organic control system are 
considerable. For some farmers, these burdens are the cause not to convert to organic 
farming or to reconvert (Rigby et al., 2001; Flaten et al., 2010).  
The “Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung” (German Council for Sustainable Development) 
recently ennobled organic farming standards as “Gold-Standard” in recognition of the 
relevance of organic farming for a sustainable agriculture (Rat für Nachhaltige 
Entwicklung, 2011). The German government pursues the objective of a 20% area share 
of organic farming in its national sustainability strategy (Die Bundesregierung, 2008). 
The achievement of this objective depends on a similar growth of the organic market, 
which requires an effective organic control system so that consumers can trust in organic 
labels.  
The work underlying the four articles presented in this thesis was accomplished in the 
research project CERTCOST “Economic analysis of certification systems for organic 
food and farming”1 ending in November 2011 (Dabbert et al., 2008). In this project, 
research institutions and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from seven countries 
combined their efforts to analyse organic controls2 from different perspectives. The 
background of such a research project with participation of SME from the organic control 
sector offered the opportunity to get and use data from different institutions, such as the 
“Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung” (BLE – Federal Office for 
Agriculture and Food) and different private control bodies. Among these control bodies’ 
data, those of a German and a Swiss control body were used for analysis in this thesis. 
                                                 
1  For further information, please refer to the project homepage: www.certcost.org.  
2  In the following text, the terms “control” and “inspection” are used synonymously. The parallel use of 
these terms results from a change in terminology of the European organic regulation: while regulation 
2092/91 used the term “inspection”, the current regulation 834/2007 uses “control”. 
CHAPTER 1  Introduction 
2 
The relevant legal framework of organic food and farming in Germany and Switzerland is 
similar3, thus, the legal requirements are only described for the German control system 
based on the European regulation on organic production and labelling of organic 
products. (Reg. (EC) 834/2007).  
The following subchapter introduces the general framework of food and farm 
certification. Chapter 1.2 illustrates the economic reasoning for organic certification. The 
concept of risk based controls is introduced and discussed in Chapter 1.3 with regard to 
its implementation in organic control systems. Then, different methods by which non-
compliance with an organic standard can be analysed are presented in chapter 1.4. 
Finally, an overview on the objectives and the organisation of this thesis is given.  
1.1 Food standards and certification  
Today’s agricultural and food production is increasingly governed by standards 
(Hatanaka et al., 2005). A standard specifies rules, e.g., how a product shall look like or 
how the production process shall be conducted. These rules intend to achieve defined 
product and process qualities to meet the specific demand of processors and consumers. 
Such standards are controlled for adherence, typically by an independent third party (next 
to seller as first and buyer as second party). In case of non-compliance with a standard, an 
enforcement system consisting of subsequent measures and actions is present. The 
assurance that a production process or a product is in conformity with a certain standard 
is then given in written form by a certificate (Codex Alimentarius Commission, 1995). 
The consumers can identify certified products by a label4.  
Codifying rules on food quality and labelling date back to the ancient world5. Today, the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission is the international reference point for food standard 
issues. The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established in the 1960s by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (FAO and WHO, 2006). Food standards evolved and diversified 
                                                 
3  According to an equivalency agreement between Switzerland and the European Union, their organic 
regulations correspond mutually (EC, 2002). 
4  Detailed information on economic aspects of food labelling, which is not dealt with in this thesis, is 
provided by Golan et al. (2001); for a general introduction on organic labelling and consumer 
preferences, see Janssen and Hamm (2012), respectively.  
5  The oldest documents on “food standards” date back to the pre-Christian time, to the Assyrian and 
Egypt people (FAO and WHO, 2006). 
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over the years along with societal demands as well as technological and scientific 
developments (Smith, 2009).  
Examples for the increasing importance of food standards and corresponding certification 
and labelling are manifold and cover a large variety of areas, such as environmental 
characteristics, animal welfare, indications of origin, and organic farming standards. At 
present, environmental, social, and ethical issues are becoming increasingly relevant for 
consumers (Wissenschaftliche Beiräte für Verbraucher- und Ernährungspolitik sowie 
Agrarpolitik, 2011). Certification and according labelling is the instrument to provide 
consumers relevant information on the production process of food.  
1.1.1 Types of food standards  
The multitude of food standards and certification can be structured according to different 
dimensions. A basic differentiation results from the kind of attributes covered by a 
standard. A product standard, specifies the attributes of a product (e.g., a marketing 
standard defining the size, shape or nutritional content) whereas a process standard 
specifies the attributes of the production process (e.g., an organic standard prohibiting the 
use of synthetic fertilisers and explicitly stating how to raise livestock). This distinction is 
of specific relevance for the organic process quality which is not visible to consumers. 
They have to trust in organic labels to distinguish the organic quality.  
Besides, the literature discriminates between public and private standards although the 
categorisation of these concepts is not perfectly clear6. In the context of organic food 
standards7 and in this thesis, the distinction is based on the attribute of the institution 
setting and governing a standard. Public standards result from public, i.e., governmental 
activities such as the European organic regulation. Private standards are issued by non-
governmental organisations such as Bioland in Germany, Bio Suisse in Switzerland or 
Soil Association in the United Kingdom. The majority of standards are published by 
private organisations (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). This also applies for the area of 
organic standards. However, the implementation of state regulations complementing 
                                                 
6  The World Trade Organisation (WTO) points to the beneficiary of a standard to distinguish private from 
public standards (WTO, 2005). Yet, in the case of organic standards this criterion is unhelpful as private 
firms (fair competition), consumers (reliable labelling) and the society (positive environmental 
externalities) can altogether benefit from organic farming standards and corresponding controls. 
7  In the following text, the term “organic standard” is used for organic food standard.  
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existing private standards is important as the state holds hierarchical power, i.e., the 
ability to sentence producers not adhering to a standard (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000).  
Anybody labelling agricultural or food products “organic” has to comply with the 
European organic regulation. Therefore, the European organic regulation can be classified 
as a mandatory organic standard8. Operators must comply with this regulation to enter the 
organic market, even, if the decision to do so is voluntary. Private organic standards in 
contrast are considered as voluntary; operators may choose to adhere to these 
requirements for personal or marketing reasons. If private standards exist in parallel to a 
mandatory standard, private standards basically imply more strict rules.  
1.1.2 Organic food standards  
Organic standards are process standards as they specify the process how organic food 
shall be produced. In Europe exists a basic public organic standard which is considered as 
mandatory. Beyond, many different private standards exist.  
At present, in the European Union, organic food and farming is regulated by a Council 
Regulation whose scope dates back to the year 1991 (EC, 1991)9. This regulation defines 
the basic prerequisites for the production and labelling of organic agricultural and food 
products. The fundamentals of organic farming, however, are much older and date back to 
the 1920s (Vogt, 2001). Then, the trade relationships between organic farmers and their 
customers were closer and more direct than today; the organic market was very small. 
Therefore, there was no essential need to define and control explicit production rules for 
organic food (Schmid, 2007). The rules of the different organic movements became more 
detailed and increased in volume in the course of time. Hence, formal guidelines (that is 
to say standards10) and corresponding control systems emerged (Vogt, 2001) to protect 
consumers from fraud with mislabelled organic products and to ensure fair competition 
between producers (Schmid, 2007).  
                                                 
8  This classification of mandatory organic standards deviates from the general classification used by the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (Smith, 2009).  
9  Regulation (EC) No 2092/91 was revised some years ago. From January 1st 2009, the revised regulation 
(EC) No 834/2007 applied as from 1 January 2009 (EC, 2007). The articles in this thesis cover the scope 
of both regulations.  
10  The term standard is used generally and covers also organic regulations of states or federations.  
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1.2 Economic concepts of organic standards and certification11 
The need for an organic standard and according certification in an anonymous market 
economy results from the specific characteristics of organic food that result from the 
production process. Three basic categories of goods are differentiated according to their 
characteristics: search, experience and credence goods (Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni, 
1973). Search characteristics can be easily identified prior to purchase, e.g., the colour of 
a tomato. Experience characteristics can only be ascertained after the purchase by using 
or consuming a good, e.g., the taste of the tomato. Finally, credence characteristics cannot 
easily (at low cost) be checked, neither before nor after the purchase, e.g., the organic 
quality of the tomato. Organic food exhibits credence characteristics. The information 
costs for consumers to assess the quality increase from search to credence attributes.  
While the consumer has to spend time and also money to gather quality information, the 
seller normally is better informed on the quality attributes of items for sale. This 
information asymmetry is most pronounced in case of credence goods. The presence of 
information asymmetries can result in market failure, namely adverse selection (Akerlof, 
1970; Fritsch et al., 2003) and favours opportunistic behaviour, e.g., fraud regarding the 
true organic quality (McCluskey, 2000).  
From the viewpoint of institutional economics, an organic standard can be considered as 
an institution, i.e., as a system of norms targeting to particular goals and comprising 
instruments of enforcement. Institutions intend to govern individual behaviour. The 
definition of rules, their control and enforcement shall guarantee certain aspects of 
quality. Transactions are simplified and market transaction costs, i.e., the costs of 
exchanging goods on the market, can be decreased (Furubotn and Richter, 2005).  
Thus, organic control systems reduce consumers’ information costs and overall market 
transaction costs and they reduce the information asymmetry. Hereby, organic control 
systems facilitate market transactions, increase market efficiency and ensure the 
functioning of organic markets (Golan et al., 2001).  
                                                 
11  This section draws on the report “Economic concepts of organic certification” by (Zorn et al., 2009).  
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1.3 Risk based control approaches12 
Risk characterises situations where the probability for the occurrence of an event is 
known. A situation in which no information on the probability of occurrence is available 
is referred to as uncertainty (Knight, 1971; Dabbert and Braun, 2006). Risk based control 
approaches intend to consider the relevant available information when determining 
control strategies and plans. The basic concept of risk based control approaches is to 
focus control resources on operators and control areas supposed to show higher risk of 
non-compliance.  
The European organic regulation requires a risk based control approach: “In the context of 
this Regulation the nature and frequency of the controls shall be determined on the basis 
of an assessment of the risk of occurrence of irregularities and infringements as regards 
compliance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation” (Art. 27(3) of Reg. (EC) 
834/2007 (EC, 2007)).  
The nature of organic controls is mainly characterised by the announcement of a control 
(announced versus unannounced controls), the coverage (e.g., a complete control of an 
operation versus partial controls), the control area (e.g., field visit versus control of 
movements of goods versus analysis sample), and the location (on-site versus remote 
control, i.e., from the control body’s office). These attributes of organic controls and their 
combinations offer specific control approaches to a multitude of possible risk situations.  
The control frequency shall depend on the risk of non-compliance. The regulation 
requires one annual control of every organic operator. More frequent controls therefore 
mean more controls in addition to the regular annual control.  
Crucial questions of any risk based control approach are the criteria and the method used 
when evaluating the risk. Regarding the criteria, the European implementation regulation 
requires “taking into account at least the results of previous controls, the quantity of 
products concerned and the risk for exchange of products” (Art. 65(4) of Reg. (EC) No 
889/2008 (EC, 2008)). The specified criterion “quantity of products concerned” directs 
the attention to an issue not considered in the basic regulation: the potential damage 
resulting from non-compliance, e.g., the damage of deceived consumers or the loss of 
reputation for the organic sector. Such damages are likely to increase with the affected 
                                                 
12  The term “risk based inspection approach” is similarly used.  
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quantity. The damage furthermore depends on the severity of non-compliance. Therefore, 
further distinction regarding the severity of non-compliance is also relevant. The severity 
of non-compliance is reflected in the subsequent sanction.  
Methods on how to determine the risk of non-compliance, either qualitatively, e.g., by a 
classification in risk classes or quantitatively, e.g., by non-compliance probabilities, are 
left up to the control authority or control body.  
Substantial literature on the risk based control approach and its implementation exists in 
the area of food safety (e.g., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2008; Hoffmann, 2010; König et al., 2010). Corresponding literature on the certification 
of process quality is relatively sparse and rarely exceeds the recommendation to 
implement such systems (e.g., Schulze et al., 2006; Albersmeier et al., 2009). A German 
handbook for organic control bodies suggests criteria to evaluate the risk of an operation 
and criteria to identify organic products with increased risk (Fischer and Neuendorff, 
2011). These guidelines suggest evaluating risk categorically. In the end, an operation is 
ranked in one of four risk classes, each with a different probability of additional spot 
checks. A recent working document of the European Commission (European Commission 
- DG Agri, 2011) recommends amongst others to consider national or regional 
characteristics of the organic market.  
Risk based control approaches are considered a promising instrument to enhance 
certification systems (Jahn et al., 2005). By implementing risk based control approaches, 
it is expected to “improve the performance” of control bodies and authorities 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004). As a result it is expected that controls 
will be more “efficient and effective” (Albersmeier et al., 2009; Rundgren, 2010). In short, 
one could have the impression that the risk based control approach is considered as a 
“panacea” for certification systems. However, it seems that the thorough application and 
comprehensive use of this instrument is not yet achieved: an organic control expert 
(Rundgren, 2010) recently stated that “there is little progress so far” on risk assessment. 
Currently, control bodies apply a multitude of individual approaches to assess risk. These 
approaches are mainly qualitative risk assessments.  
So far, purely quantitative empirical analyses of risk in quality control systems are not 
documented in the literature. This thesis tries to fill important parts of the academic voids 
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regarding risk based approaches. This is performed by means of an analysis of 
determinants of non-compliance and by heuristically considering control strategies.  
1.4 Analysing non-compliance with organic farming standards  
The question, if a farmer complies with an organic farming standard seems at first sight 
simple to answer with “yes” or “no”. However, there exists a multitude of areas where 
non-compliance occurs, differently affecting organic integrity. Furthermore, different 
levels of sanctions are applied – reflecting an evaluation of the severity of non-
compliance. The classification of both, non-compliance and resulting sanctions, differs 
considerably between countries (Gambelli et al., 2012). Depending on the specific 
characteristics of available control data, the adequate econometric model should be 
selected. This section illustrates important characteristics of organic control data and 
briefly presents potential modelling approaches.  
1.4.1 Organic control data  
Control bodies perform at least one annual control of each operation. The characteristics 
of the control, the farms, farms’ production, non-compliances, and resulting sanctions are 
recorded. These voluminous records are usually stored in structured data base systems. 
The data are mainly collected for control and certification reasons and to fulfil the 
regulatory requirements including data provision for governmental supervision and 
statistical reasons (Zorn et al., 2012). It is not possible to perform econometric analysis 
without prior processing of organic control data (Moschitz et al., 2009; Gambelli et al., 
2012)13. Maybe, this technical obstacle partly explains why control bodies mainly rely on 
qualitative risk assessment.  
The data recorded by control bodies report the detected and documented non-
compliances. Indeed, there exist non-compliances which were not detected; this dark 
figure is unknown. Regularly, fraud cases are disclosed by institutions outside the organic 
control system, e.g., by general food and feed controls (e.g., the case of Robert 
Franzsander in Germany in 2009 (Thuneke, 2009)) or by tax audits (e.g., the recent case 
of faked organic certificates in Italy made public in 2011 (BioHandel-online.de, 2011)). 
                                                 
13  Further details on the data collection processes of control bodies and the availability of data are 
documented in Moschitz et al. (2009); the efforts required to prepare the econometric analysis are 
described in Gambelli et al. (2012).  
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The methods usually used to shed light on dark figures (interviews of offenders, 
participant observation) are not appropriate in the area of business crime 
(Bundesministerium des Inneren and Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2006) among which 
severe non-compliances with organic standards can be categorised.  
According to the official German statistics, a very low share, below 0.5% of organic 
operators, committed severe non-compliance during the years 2009 and 2010 
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010; Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2011)14. The 
preponderance of compliant operators limits the power of modelling severe non-
compliance when a fixed sample is given, as it was the case in the econometric analyses 
of this thesis, or requires larger samples. Minor non-compliances usually are detected 
more frequently (Gambelli et al., 2012).  
The data on non-compliance generally is not categorised according to severity by control 
bodies. In a risk based control model, however, the severity of non-compliance is 
important. As a proxy for the severity of non-compliance, the consequential sanction can 
be used.  
1.4.2 Econometric methods for the analysis of organic control 
data 
For the analysis of categorical variables, different approaches exist. Depending on the 
information content of the control data, different econometric models are available. A 
logistic regression model can explain binary outcomes. Such a model is appropriate to 
explain the sanction probability globally disregarding the severity of a sanction. It can 
also be applied to explain specific, e.g., only severe sanctions (Urban, 1993; Long and 
Freese, 2006).  
The ordinal logistic regression model additionally considers the severity of a sanction. If 
the sanction categories can be ordered, such a model can be applied. It uses the 
information provided by the sanction data more comprehensively than a binary logistic 
model. The ordinal logistic regression model is based on the assumption of parallel 
regression. In other words, the estimated probability curves for different sanction 
                                                 
14  The share of severely non-compliant operators is provided for the years 2009 (0,38%) and 2010 (0,39%) 
only, since these shares seem reliable as they correspond to other countries’ data. In previous years, the 
shares partly were considerably higher. This can be explained due to missing definitions of central 
terms, see Zorn et al. (2012).  
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categories are just “moved” (Urban, 1993; Long and Freese, 2006). See chapter 3.4 for 
further details on the ordinal logistic regression model, which is used for the analysis of 
German control data.  
Panel modelling is also an option, as control data typically consists of repeated (yearly) 
measurements of the same variables. The organic control data exhibits only little variation 
(especially regarding the farm structure data) (Gambelli et al., 2012). Fixed effects 
models are therefore not suited (as time-constant variables are removed prior to 
estimation). Random effects models assume that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated 
with the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2006). See chapter 4.3.2 for further details 
on random effects models, which are used for the analysis of Swiss control data. 
These methods, shortly presented, were applied in the econometric analyses in this thesis. 
Relevant criterion for applying a particular method is the character of the dependent 
variable, i.e., the sanction imposed. German sanction data feature definite ordinal 
characteristics, whereas the Swiss sanction data covers 17 different sanctions which 
cannot be ordered unambiguously.  
Furthermore, the characteristics of organic control data principally also allow the 
application of count data analysis relying on specific probability distributions 
(Winkelman, 2010). However, the rare occurrence of operators with more than on 
sanction (i.e., acutal counts) in the available data limits the use of count data models.  
1.5 Objectives of this thesis  
The preceding text illustrates the setting of organic certification systems from an 
economic viewpoint. This area offers different research opportunities. Covering societal 
questions and specific questions on the implementation of an organic control system, for 
this thesis, the following objectives were selected constituting an expedient overall work:  
(1) Demonstrate the need for supervision of certification systems that rely on controls 
performed by private control bodies.  
(2) Develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of certification systems.  
(3) Assess the suitability of the data collected for the supervision of organic control 
systems.  
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(4) Identify the determinants of non-compliance of organic farmers regarding the 
adherence to an organic standard.  
(5) Synthesise the results of the econometric models in a heuristic model that covers 
the determinants of non-compliance by considering the societal costs of standard’s 
control and enforcement and the damages resulting from non-compliance. 
(6) Demonstrate the effects of important parameters in the model to optimise 
enforcement measures (control efforts and sanctions).  
1.6 Organisation of the thesis  
The thesis is based on four articles constituting a cumulative dissertation15. One of these 
articles has been accepted by a peer reviewed journal. Three articles currently are subject 
to review processes of peer-reviewed journals. The articles are dealing with different 
present questions regarding certification systems that are of relevance for both, the 
governance and supervision of a certification system, as well as for its implementation.  
The article “Supervising a system of approved private control bodies for certification: the 
case of organic farming in Germany” applies a game theoretic model to show the need 
for supervision of private control bodies. A framework is developed to analyse the 
supervision of a control system identifying relevant determinants that influence control 
results. This framework is of high relevance for the subsequent analysis. Based on 
German data collected for supervision of the control system, statistical tests are used to 
assess the suitability of these data for supervision purposes. This work illustrates the need 
for supervision of private control bodies and the need for an analysis of more detailed 
control data on operator level.  
This need for a quantitative analysis of detailed data is approached by the following two 
articles. These articles analyse factors contributing to non-compliance based on individual 
operator data provided by organic control bodies. The analysis of risks for non-
compliance is of relevance for both, the supervision of the system and the control 
planning of control bodies (cf. chapter 1.3). Currently, mainly qualitative risk assessments 
are applied. This approach can be further developed by complementing the qualitative 
                                                 
15  The following four chapters each represent one article. These articles are merged in this thesis without 
perfect harmonisation regarding spelling (mostly British English, but in chapter 5, American English) 
and the reference systems (the journals’ to which the articles have been submitted reference systems is 
maintained).  
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assessment with elaborate quantitative analyses. Based on the “Economics of Crime” 
approach (Becker, 1968), hypotheses on factors affecting the probability of non-
compliance are derived. These hypotheses are then tested by the help of logistic 
regression models on operator data to explain sanctions used as proxy for non-
compliance.  
The article “An analysis of the risks of non-compliance with the European organic 
standard: a categorical analysis of farm data from a German control body” comprises 
cross-sectional analyses based on ordinal logistic regression models. The data were 
provided by a German control body and result from organic farm controls against the 
European organic regulation. The article “Econometric analysis of non-compliance with 
organic farming standards in Switzerland” is based on Swiss control data resulting from a 
private certification system. Random effects logistic regression accompanied by cross-
sectional logistic regression models including time-lagged effects are used for the 
analysis of Swiss data.  
The determinants of non-compliance empirically identified were considered in a broader 
conceptual approach in the fourth article “A heuristic model for optimizing the 
enforcement of organic farming standards”. Based on the decision calculus of an 
opportunistic farmer, a model is developed considering the cost of inspection, potential 
fines for non-compliant operators and social damages resulting from non-compliance. 
The application of this model in different settings of relevant factors illustrates their 
interplay. This model and the simulations build on the results of the preceding articles and 
examine the control system and inherent risks from a societal view that is of relevance for 
supervision and control strategies.  
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2 Supervising a system of approved private control bodies for 
certification: the case of organic farming in Germany1 
Authors: Alexander Zorn, Christian Lippert, Stephan Dabbert  
Abstract: Organic food certification by private control bodies (CBs) requires supervision 
to prevent adverse selection. We investigate whether the official data used for supervision 
are suitable to assess the control system. To demonstrate the need for supervision, a 
heuristic game theoretic model analysing different levels of control qualities is presented. 
Relevant determinants that might explain differences among CBs are discussed. Data 
analysis is based on data collected from annual supervision reports on the German 
organic control system from 2006 to 2008. Statistical analysis reveals significant 
differences among CBs. The data available in the supervision reports are not sufficient to 
explain the differences identified. Consequences for future data collection on and 
supervision of European organic control systems are discussed.  
Keywords: Organic food, third-party certification, supervision, adverse selection, 
Germany 
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2.1 Introduction 
An organic certification system is needed for the existence of a functioning organic 
market (Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, & Spiller, 2009; Deaton, 2004; Jahn, Schramm, & 
Spiller, 2005; McCluskey, 2000; Tanner, 2000). Worldwide, the organic certification 
sector is dominated by three government-led systems: the European, the U.S., and the 
Japanese systems, with the European system being the oldest. The European organic 
certification system allows for different institutional settings and organisational details in 
different member states of the EU. Particularly interesting are configurations that involve 
a system of private control bodies (CBs), as in Germany, our case study country.  
German organic operators are allowed to choose between different CBs and to change to 
a different CB if they wish. The free choice of a CB is intended to enhance competition 
among the different CBs. For a given quality of monitoring and certification, competition 
at best may lead to lower certification costs for organic operators, thus contributing to 
lower consumer prices for organic food as well.  
However, stiff competition between private CBs might jeopardise the functioning of the 
organic control system (Anders, Monteiro, & Rouviere, 2007; De & Nabar, 1991; Jahn et 
al., 2005). According to a survey of 34 CBs in different parts of the world, 9% of the 
respondents thought “that the competition drove down the tariffs to an unsustainably low 
level and that it made business survival difficult. Eighteen per cent said that the 
competition puts a downward pressure on the scrutiny of the controls” (Rundgren, 2009). 
In the same vein, some organic operators seem to be worried about control quality: a 
representative of the German Bioland association noted that the association receives more 
phone calls from farmers saying that their supervisor was not strict enough than vice 
versa (Busse, 2009).  
Competition can only work if the quality of services like monitoring and certifying is 
adequately rewarded. This is usually the case for services with mainly private benefits. 
With organic certification, however, important benefits are external (i.e., they do not 
accrue to the firm paying for the service). Therefore, for competing CBs, there might be 
an incentive to reduce the thoroughness of monitoring to offer certification at a lower fee 
(Jahn et al., 2005). This problem may be relevant for other realms of food quality 
certification. 
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Such a situation would pose a serious problem to the organic market. Consumers assume 
that organic certification guarantees the organic integrity of the product, regardless of 
which CB has issued the certificate. Consequently, the European system for organic 
certification foresees the supervision of private CBs by member state government 
authorities (European Council, 1991, Art. 9(4)). In turn, these government authorities 
report to the European Commission.  
Our central research question asks whether these official data are suitable to assess the 
control system. Do the supervision data suggest that there are no differences among CBs? 
This research question has not been previously analysed in the literature.  
We first describe the European organic certification system, including its supervision 
process, with special reference to the German situation. Next, a heuristic game theoretic 
model is used to explain the social dilemma we see at the core of the supervision task. We 
then describe the framework for analysing the supervision of organic certification and 
relate this framework to previous literature on the topic. Subsequently, we present our 
data, discuss the results, and conclude. 
2.2 The European organic certification system, supervision, and 
possible determinants of differences among control bodies 
The legal basis of the European organic certification system has recently changed. Since 
January 1, 2009, Reg. (EC) No 834/2007 and the corresponding implementation rule Reg. 
(EC) No 889/2008 have been in force. However, because our data are from 2006 to 2008, 
we concentrate on the legal system that was valid during the time that our data were 
generated. In many aspects, the two legal systems are quite similar.  
Under regulation (EC) No 2092/91 (valid until December 2008), the European Union 
required member states to establish a control system to assure organic quality. Organic 
operators were controlled for compliance with this organic standard. Member states could 
opt for one of three different control systems: A, B or C (European Union, 2009).  
In System A, private CBs perform a third-party certification. These CBs must be 
approved by the government (i.e., by the “competent authority”). System B is a public 
control system in which the public authority performs the certification and no separate 
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approval is necessary. Finally, System C is a mixture of Systems A and B. We are 
concerned in this paper with System A, which is dominant in the EU; 17 out of 27 
member states implemented this system. Germany is the country with the largest number 
of private CBs among countries adhering to System A.  
The approval and subsequent supervision of private CBs include three tasks: 
• CBs must be accredited according to European Standard EN 45011 (respectively, 
ISO Guide 65),  
• They must be approved by a designated governmental authority, and  
• They must be continuously supervised by the competent authority of a member 
state. 
The authorities of member states are charged with ensuring objective and independent 
controls and verifying the effectiveness of controls (European Council, 1991, Art. 9(6)). 
In Germany, this responsibility lies with the Länder (i.e., federal states). The member 
states report information on the control system and its supervision on an annual basis to 
the European Commission. These reports are called supervision reports. In Germany, this 
task is performed by the Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung (BLE), which 
provided the data for this paper.  
The BLE is in charge of collecting data from the CBs in the format required by the 
European Commission. The competent authorities in the Länder also collect data for their 
own purposes. These latter authorities have additional means of supervising the CBs. For 
example, they can accompany control visits, and they have the right to see all of a CB’s 
information on a specific operator. In severe cases of non-compliance, the competent 
authorities do the sanctioning themselves or forward all necessary information to the 
appropriate legal system.  
This process implies a division of labour between the CBs and the competent authorities, 
but the details vary among the Länder. To reduce the differences in implementation 
across the Länder, a working party was established to discuss implementation questions 
and to provide guidance for the competent authorities. This working party includes all 
competent authorities in Germany and the BLE. Its decisions are not legally binding, but 
they are generally adopted by the competent authorities. 
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The competent authorities thus have a double role: they supervise the CBs, and they 
perform practical implementation tasks, especially with respect to sanctioning. Because 
the European Commission can be regarded as the final “owner” of the organic 
certification system, it makes sense to have a secondary supervision level.  
The entire organic control system is ultimately supervised by the European Commission 
(European Council, 1991, Art. 15) based on the supervision reports provided by the 
member states. To guarantee an “equally strict control system” (European Commission - 
DG Agri, 2010), the analysis of national control data is seen as an essential instrument for 
monitoring the implementation of the European organic regulation in the 27 member 
states. This article is concerned with this level of supervision. 
The European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004) has remarked on variations in the quality of supervision, and the 
Court of Auditors has pointed to problems with the organic control system and its 
supervision in a special report (Court of Auditors, 2005). The European Commission 
seems to be aware that the system continues to struggle with variations in 
implementation, the “different definitions of the parameters and the different data 
acquisition” methods (EC, n.d.-c) of the member states (see also EC, n.d.-a; EC, n.d.-b).  
Controls in the organic system take different forms. The annual control visit of each 
operator is mandatory (i.e., all operators must be visited by an inspector every year). An 
additional 10% of operators in Germany (20% in Bavaria) were visited twice during the 
time that our data were generated (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010). These control 
visits can take place either announced or unannounced. The control body can also take 
samples for testing (for example, for pesticide residues). However, for Germany, the 
competent authorities have prescribed no minimum number of samples.  
“Irregularities” and “infringements” may be found among the results of the controls and 
the certification process. These terms are given but not explicitly defined in the respective 
regulations either before or after the recent reform. Following regulation (EC) No 
2092/91, an irregularity shall result in a sanction according to Article 9(9a) (i.e., removal 
of the organic label from the product/lot), and an infringement shall result in a sanction 
according to Article 9(9b) (i.e., prohibition of organic marketing for the operator). 
According to the legal notion of commensurability, it is obvious that irregularities and 
infringements refer to more severe cases of non-compliance and thus indicate a subset of 
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overall non-compliance. Furthermore, it can be inferred that an infringement is more 
severe than an irregularity.  
It is important to note that the lack of a common definition is likely to affect the reliability 
of the data. Data collection that does not follow a unified process might be one possible 
reason for the differences among CBs. This shortcoming was mentioned in the first 
“Report on Supervision” (EC, n.d.-a.) on the year 2005 by the European Commission, and 
it persists to the present.  
2.3 Why supervision of control bodies is needed: a game theoretic 
model  
Honest operators acquainted with and committed to organic farming do not need 
scrupulous control of their own farms; they know that they produce organic quality and 
comply with all relevant rules for the organic production process. For such operators, the 
function of an organic certification system is to ensure that all other (perhaps 
opportunistic) organic operators comply with the relevant standard. Non-compliance by 
other organic operators might damage the collective reputation of organic products and be 
detrimental to the marketing of honest operators. Ensuring this collective reputation could 
become difficult in a situation in which several CBs offer certification for different fees at 
different degrees of thoroughness. 
The following heuristic example illustrates this problem. Imagine an organic market that 
consists of a given number of good, honest, and skilled operators (i.e., “committed 
operators”) (j) and three opportunistic operators (i.e., “non-committed operators”) (i = 1, 
2, 3). Every operator can choose between two CBs with a different attitude. For 
simplicity, we distinguish a “rigorous” CB and an “easy-going” one. Both bodies ask for 
fees, which are private costs borne by the operators. They provide some private benefits, 
such as extension services. Strictly speaking, CBs are not allowed to explicitly perform 
extension services. In practice, however, a skilfully performed control visit can help an 
operator to identify possible improvements in his operation that would not have been 
detected otherwise. This could be termed “implicit extension” and entails a private 
benefit.  
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In the case of non-committed operators, the overall private benefits from the rigorous CB 
are lower because of higher compliance costs; this body forces the operator to fulfil all 
rules. Only the rigorous CB contributes to safeguarding the external benefit of the 
collective reputation. For every non-committed operator certified by the rigorous body, 
the overall net benefit of every operator increases by a certain amount as fewer scandals 
will occur. This example results in the following payoff equation for a non-committed 
operator i when certified by a rigorous CB:  
 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖 = −𝑐𝑃 +  𝑏𝑃𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖𝑏𝐸  ,      (2.1) 
The corresponding equation for a committed operator j is:  𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑗 = −𝑐𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃𝑗 +  𝑠𝑖𝑏𝐸 ,      (2.2) with 
cP Private cost (i.e., certification fee) 
bE Every supplier’s external benefit because of good monitoring and avoided 
losses to the collective reputation due to strictly monitored non-committed 
suppliers 
bPi Private benefit of a non-committed operator (i.e., the value of extension 
services minus additional compliance cost) 
bPj Private benefit of a committed operator (i.e., the value of extension services 
and/or the so-called “good feelings” from supporting a good CB) 
si Number of non-committed operators selecting a rigorous CB (0 ≤ si ≤ 3) 
 
A possible setting of the relevant parameters is given in Table 2.1. Please note that the 
figures in our example are chosen for didactic purposes. We believe that a numerical 
example is better suited to convey the main idea than purely algebraic formulae.  
Table 2.1 Assumed costs and benefits resulting from certification by different control bodies 
(CBs). 
  Rigorous CB Easy-going CB 
Private cost  
(certification fee) 
cP 50 40 
External benefit bE 20 – 
Private benefit 
(non-committed  
operator) 
bPi 5 
(value of extension minus 
additional compliance cost) 
10 
(value of extension) 
Private benefit  
(committed operator) 
 
bPj 30 
(value of extension and good 
feeling of supporting a 
committed CB) 
5 
(value of extension) 
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Transferring the assumed costs and benefits into a payoff matrix leads to Table 2.2. This 
table indicates the individual payoff given the choice between a rigorous CB and an easy-
going one for both types of operators, non-committed operators (denoted i) and 
committed operators (denoted j). Instructions for reading the table are given at the bottom 
of Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 Payoff matrix (i.e., net benefits) for varying numbers of committed operators and three 
non-committed organic operators based on their choice of different CBs. 
Net benefits of … Number of non-committed operators other than i  choosing an easy-going CB 
  0 1 2 
Committed operator j  
choosing… 
rigorous 
CB 
easy-
going CB 
rigorous 
CB 
easy-
going CB 
rigorous 
CB 
easy-
going CB 
Non-
committed 
operator i  
 choosing… 
rigorous CB 15a 40b 15a 25b -5a 20b -5a 5b -25a 0b -25a -15b 
easy-going 
CB 10 20 10 5 -10 0 -10 -15 -30 -20 -30 -35 
a Benefit of non-committed operator i; b Benefit of committed operator j.  
Example that gives instructions on how to read the data in the table: If  
- the committed operator j chooses a rigorous CB, and,  
- the non-committed operator i chooses a rigorous CB, and,  
- the number of non-committed operators other than i choosing an easy-going CB is 0,  
then  
- the net benefit for the non-committed operator i is 15, and 
- the net benefit for the committed operator j is 40.  
This is the dominant solution because  
- if the committed operator j is choosing an easy-going CB given that the non-committed one sticks to 
his choice,  
  he is worse off, 
- if the non-committed operator i is choosing an easy-going CB given that the committed one sticks to 
his choice,  
  he is worse off, and  
- equally, if both operators chose an easy-going CB, they are both worse off compared to the original 
situation  
Payoffs resulting from costs and benefits given in Table 2.1 
 
Note that under the assumptions of Table 2.1, all operators choose the rigorous body. 
Given that all other non-committed operators chose the rigorous CB, it is beneficial for 
the last non-committed operator to choose this CB. Furthermore, we assume that fees are 
independent of the number of clients. All operators wish to remain organic because the 
corresponding advantages (including subsidies) are thought to compensate for higher 
production and transaction costs (i.e., costs related to the exchange of a good 
(Williamson, 1985)) as compared with conventional farming. These assumptions lead to 
the payoff matrix presented in Table 2.2.  
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Because choosing a rigorous CB is the dominant strategy (Liebi, 2002; Varian, 2002) for 
both kinds of operators, the equilibrium produced is characterised by the bold net benefits 
presented in Table 2.2. In this case, the easy-going CB disappears from the market, and 
the opportunistic non-committed operators choose the rigorous CB because their 
individual gains in additional shared reputation outweigh the resulting higher fees and 
compliance costs. If, ceteris paribus, the private benefit of the committed operator was set 
to zero for both kinds of CBs in the equilibrium (perhaps because the committed operator 
needs no implicit extension services and has no additional “good feeling”, as defined 
above), all committed operators would opt for the easy-going body, while the non-
committed operators would remain with the rigorous CB. This situation would not affect 
the collective organic reputation because, by definition, committed producers always 
comply with the standard, regardless of how they are monitored. 
Table 2.3 shows the resulting net benefits using the parameter values in Table 2.1, except 
for the fee of the easy-going body, which is lowered to 30 instead of 40 monetary units 
and thus less than the rigorous body’s fee.  
Table 2.3 Payoff matrix (i.e., net benefits) for varying numbers of committed operators and three 
non-committed organic operators depending on the choice of different CBs. 
Net benefits of … Number of non-committed operators other than i  choosing an easy-going CB 
  0 1 2 
Committed operator j  
choosing … 
rigorous 
CB 
easy-
going CB 
rigorous 
CB 
easy-
going CB 
rigorous 
CB 
easy-
going CB 
Non-
committed 
operator i 
choosing… 
rigorous CB 15a 40b 15a 35b -5a 20b -5a 15b -25a 0b -25a -5b 
easy-going 
CB 20 20 20 15 0 0 0 -5 -20 -20 -20 -25 
a Benefit of non-committed operator i; b Benefit of committed operator j.  
Payoffs resulting from costs and benefits given in Table 2.1 except for the private cost of the easy-going CB, 
which here is 30 instead of 40 
 
In this scenario, the dominant strategy for a non-committed operator is to choose the 
easy-going CB, regardless of how many other non-committed operators opt for this CB. 
The committed operators that choose the more expensive, stricter CB to ensure their 
collective reputation cannot prevent the non-committed operators from opting for the 
poor CB, which offers negligent certification at a low fee. 
Whereas the committed operators cannot influence the monitoring quality experienced by 
their opportunistic colleagues, the latter are caught in a social dilemma. Instead of the 15 
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monetary units of net benefit that each non-committed operator would receive if all of 
them chose the rigorous CB, the equilibrium attained will make them each worse off by 
20 units. If the committed operators, realising that they cannot influence the monitoring 
quality by CB choice, assign only a private benefit of, for example, 15 units (instead of 
30) to the certification by the rigorous body, their dominant strategy would also be to 
elect the easy-going CB. Consequently, the strict CB would disappear from the organic 
control market. 
In the end, all operators would choose the inexpensive CB with poor monitoring quality. 
In the real world, such adverse selection could make scrupulous CBs disappear 
completely from the market. Scandals and reputation losses due to sloppy controls might 
finally lead to the collapse of organic markets (Jahn et al., 2005). Tirole (1996) developed 
a dynamic model for the economic analysis of the collective reputation resulting from the 
individual reputations of present and former group members. He showed that once a 
collective reputation is poor because of the former behaviour of group members, this 
reputation tends to persist because committed behaviour only yields low individual rents.  
One way out of this dilemma involves the effective supervision of the private CBs by 
competent public authorities (Deaton, 2004). Regarding this solution, our hypothesis is as 
follows. If effective supervision is performed, the monitoring behaviour of the CBs and 
(assuming that their clients share a similar structure) the resulting share of reported non-
compliances and related sanctions should not vary significantly among different CBs. 
Before we quantitatively investigate this hypothesis, we discuss the framework on which 
we base this analysis.  
2.4 Framework for analysing the supervision system  
In an ideal certification system that assumes the random allocation of operators to CBs, 
we would expect all CBs to use the same control mechanisms and control frequencies. In 
such a system, there would be no difference in control behaviour among CBs. However, 
in reality, three main characteristics may contribute to differences in the proportion and 
type of non-compliances identified and the sanctions imposed by different CBs (see also 
Fig. 2.1): 
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1. The structure of the clients controlled (e.g., honest versus fraudulent clients, the 
type of operations, their size, socio-demographic variables, and criminal record),  
2. Control characteristics (e.g., frequency and type of controls, risk-oriented 
selection of operators to be controlled, and quality of the control visit),  
3. Rigidity of the CB when non-compliances are detected (i.e., its “attitude”). 
Characteristics 2 and 3 can be summarised as the so-called “market behaviour” of the 
CBs.  
 
Fig. 2.1 Framework for analysing the supervision system of organic certification bodies.  
Source: own graph. 
 
The structure and behaviour of the controlled clients is very relevant to the number of 
non-compliances found (Albersmeier et al., 2009). If the assumption of a random 
allocation of operators is not given, a CB might have a high proportion of small farms 
among its clients. For example, Henson and Heasman (1998) identified firm size as key 
factor for compliance with new food safety regulations. In addition, a CB might have a 
high proportion of clients that pursue organic activities that are more prone to non-
compliance than others. Clients might differ with respect to personal characteristics 
relevant for compliance, such as socio-demographic and psychological characteristics 
(Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006; McCarthy, O'Reilly, O'Sullivan, & 
Guerin, 2007 on the commitment to organic farming and compliance) and risk 
preferences (Halek & Eisenhauer, 2001). In general, clients could differ with respect to 
their organic farming activities (e.g., by belonging to different farm types such as dairy 
CHAPTER 2  Supervising a Control System  
28 
farms or arable farms). Consequently, their compliance costs as well as their future losses 
if they lose organic status in the event of detected non-compliance would differ. 
Following the general approach of the “Economics of Crime” (Becker, 1968, 1976; for an 
application to food safety issues see Lippert, 2002), such variations would cause 
differences in compliance behaviour. 
The characteristics of control visits are often seen as highly relevant for the detection of 
non-compliances. It has been argued that unannounced controls result in higher detection 
rates (Crucefix, 2006; Rundgren, 2007). However, scientific evidence backing this 
common argument is lacking. Assuming a given average detection rate per control, higher 
control frequencies result in higher detection rates. Another aspect affecting the detection 
of non-compliance is the CB specific risk-based inspection approach (Houghton et al., 
2008; Szajkowska, 2009), which is required by the EU regulation (Annex III, General 
provisions, 5.). The objective of a risk-based inspection approach is to focus resources on 
risky operators with regards to the frequency and intensity of controls (Alderman & 
Tabor, 1989; Fischer & Neuendorff, 2009 on guidelines and criteria for the 
implementation of risk oriented controls; Jahn et al., 2005). The structure and function of 
such risk-based inspection systems have not been deeply analysed (Albersmeier et al., 
2009). However, CBs have different risk-based systems in place that might influence their 
success rate in identifying non-compliance cases. In addition, the overall quality of the 
control visit depends on the qualifications of the inspectors, their experience, and their 
level of scrutiny (Albersmeier et al., 2009).  
The attitude of a CB can influence the judgement of an inspector during the control visit 
when there is room for interpretation (Albersmeier et al., 2009). Different interpretations 
of similar facts can result in different consequences or sanctions during the evaluation of 
the control report back at the CB office. Such differences in attitude (and, as a result, 
interpretation) are potentially quite important for the entire CB market (Jahn et al., 2005).  
From a dynamic perspective, former controls and their results may influence non-
compliance. A strict interpretation of an organic standard and a strict attitude resulting in 
rigorous sanctions for non-compliance can result in a strict reputation for a CB at a later 
time. Such a reputation can lead to diligent work by the operators controlled, making non-
diligent operators leave or scaring fraudulent operators controlled by the CB (Eide, 
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Rubin, & Shepherd, 2006). In this case, the CB will report fewer non-compliance cases 
and correspondingly fewer sanctions.  
2.5 Data and research method  
The data obtained from the BLE include information on all organic CBs active in 
Germany and their organic certification activities between 2006 and 2008 (Bundesanstalt 
für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c). Information on certification 
activities includes the number of control visits (differentiated into announced and 
unannounced controls), the number of samples taken, the number of irregularities and 
infringements detected (as severe non-compliances), and the number of severe sanctions 
imposed. The data provided were generally disaggregated into types of operations (i.e., 
production, processing, importing, and others). However, in 2006, there was no category 
for “other”. For this year, the non-compliances and sanctions were reported as an 
aggregate of all areas of operation. Note that the data only contain variables for severe 
non-compliance and control characteristics, but there are no structural data on the 
operators and no variable that could serve as a proxy for CB attitudes.  
There are some obvious problems in the data. The number of severe non-compliances 
detected decreases considerably over the three years, from 19,329 irregularities and 
infringements in 2006 to 3,528 in 2007 and 1,709 in 2008. In the same period, the number 
of severe sanctions with financial consequences for the respective operators is relatively 
stable. According to regulation (EC) No. 2092/91, however, an irregularity shall result in 
a sanction according to Article 9, paragraph 9a, and an infringement shall result in a 
sanction according to Article 9, paragraph 9b. The considerable decline in the number of 
non-compliances in parallel with the stable level of sanctions can only be explained by a 
structural change in data collection methods (e.g., reporting marginal non-compliances of 
lower importance as compared with irregularities and infringements, especially in 2006). 
This change over time could be explained by incomplete definitions for irregularities and 
infringements.  
The data can be used to test the null hypothesis that the sanction frequency between two 
CBs is equal. To test this hypothesis, we use the sanction frequency resulting from severe 
non-compliances because the data on sanctions are stable over time, whereas the non-
CHAPTER 2  Supervising a Control System  
30 
compliance data seem to be influenced by changing definitions over time. Given an 
identical structure of clients, equal control frequency and accuracy, and common rigour 
with regards to the interpretation of the legal framework, similar results are expected 
across different CBs.  
Because severe non-compliances occur only rarely (see Table 2.4), the observed sanction 
frequency (i.e., severe sanctions observed per 1,000 operators and year) of CBs with a 
small number of operators is very likely to randomly fluctuate much more between years 
than the observed sanction frequency of large CBs. To limit this effect, the data analysis 
is only conducted for large CBs that are characterised by more than 1,000 controlled 
operators. Nine CBs fulfil this criterion. These CBs represent at least 86% of operators 
controlled in each year.  
Given the structure of the data, the potential for statistical analysis is limited. In a first 
step, the sanction frequency is used to compare the CBs pairwise with their control 
results. The method used to compare the sanction frequencies among CBs is Fisher’s 
exact test, which allows for the comparison of small samples and small expected 
frequencies (Rüger, 1996; Sachs, 1984).  
2.6 Results  
2.6.1 Testing for differences among control bodies 
The 9 large CBs included in this analysis on average imposed 3.57 severe sanctions per 
1,000 operators from 2006 to 2008. Differentiating by year and CB, notable differences 
emerge regarding the number of sanctions imposed (e.g., see CB 3 versus CB 4 in Table 
2.4). Some CBs maintain a more or less similar level of sanction frequency over time 
(e.g., CB 1 and CB 8), whereas others feature considerable decreases (e.g., CB 3 and CB 
4) or increases (e.g., CB 5).  
A simple pairwise comparison of the sanction frequencies between the large CBs reveals 
significant differences in every year examined, with 11 significant differences in 2006, 19 
in 2007, and 21 in 2008. Over the years, 51 of the 107 comparisons (47.7%) among CBs 
feature significantly different sanction frequencies. Table 2.5 provides an overview of the 
p-values of all comparisons between the selected CBs from 2006 to 2008. 
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Table 2.4 Severe sanctions per 1,000 controlled operators (according to Article 9 of Reg. (EC) 
2091/91) for 9 large CBs (own calculation, based on data from the BLE for the years 2006 to 
2008). 
 2006 2007 2008 average 2006-08 
CB 1 6.11 6.06 4.24 5.47 
CB 2 1.99 0.88 4.70 2.52 
CB 3 3.05 0.00 0.00 1.02 
CB 4 12.17 14.68 0.00 8.95 
CB 5 3.33 6.52 12.77 7.54 
CB 6 2.24 1.04 0.74 1.34 
CB 7 1.38 2.04 6.23 3.22 
CB 8 0.88 2.35 1.48 1.57 
CB 9 3.72 7.76 3.32 4.93 
All large CBs 3.97 4.03 2.70 3.57 
 
Table 2.5 The p-values from pairwise comparisons of sanction frequencies between large CBs 
based on Fisher’s exact test (own calculation, based on data from the BLE for the years 2006 to 
2008). Significant values at the 0.05 level are marked in bold. 
  CB 1 CB 2 CB 3 CB 4 CB 5 CB 6 CB 7 CB 8 
CB 2 2006 0.138        
  2007 0.028        
  2008 0.347        
CB 3 2006 0.164 0.725       
  2007 0.000 0.304       
  2008 0.007 0.003       
CB 4 2006 0.016 0.003 0.001      
  2007 0.000 0.000 0.000      
  2008 0.006 0.002 –a      
CB 5 2006 0.229 0.719 1.000 0.001     
  2007 0.722 0.020 0.000 0.013     
  2008 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000     
CB 6 2006 0.002 1.000 0.450 0.000 0.426    
  2007 0.000 1.000 0.133 0.000 0.000    
  2008 0.004 0.004 0.365 0.369 0.000    
CB 7 2006 0.024 1.000 0.480 0.000 0.311 0.758   
  2007 0.082 0.637 0.047 0.000 0.069 0.400   
  2008 0.037 0.797 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000   
CB 8 2006 0.026 0.603 0.434 0.000 0.260 0.502 1.000  
  2007 0.064 1.000 0.108 0.000 0.055 0.643 1.000  
  2008 0.752 0.252 0.128 0.112 0.000 0.303 0.050  
CB 9 2006 0.389 0.706 0.766 0.008 1.000 0.364 0.272 0.228 
  2007 0.454 0.010 0.000 0.056 0.686 0.000 0.036 0.028 
  2008 0.610 0.549 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.232 0.479 
  a both CBs did not report any sanction in this year   
 
When testing many hypotheses with a specified Type I error probability (in this case, 
5%), multiple testing problems occur. With the number of hypotheses tested, the 
probability increases that “at least some Type I errors are committed” (Shaffer, 1995). 
The unweighted Bonferroni method suggests that the significance level must be divided 
by the number of tests (here, 36 pairwise comparisons per year) to derive a multiple 
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significance level. Under the assumption of a true null hypothesis (i.e., there are no 
differences among the CBs) and for an overall error probability of 5%, this results in an 
adapted significance level of 0.0014. At this level, at least 23 results (21.5% of all 
comparisons) with p-values of 0.000 are still significantly different. 
Our analysis of the data collected on supervision shows that in the German organic 
control system, significantly different control results exist among CBs from 2006 to 2008. 
This leads us to question which factors could explain these differences.  
2.6.2 Explaining the identified differences in sanction 
frequencies  
The data available provide information on only some of the factors identified in chapter 
2.4 (see Fig. 2.1). Factors that could be related to the differences among CBs that are 
covered by the data include the structure of the clients (i.e., number of farmers, 
processors, importers, and others – that is the area of production), control characteristics 
(i.e., control frequency and the number of announced and unannounced controls), and the 
sanction frequency. In Table 2.6, these data are compiled and compared for a selection of 
notable CBs that either sanction much more than the other CBs or much less.  
The average number of severe sanctions in Table 2.6 is based on the same information as 
in Table 2.4, but in a different format. This is the variable that we would like to explain. 
However, given the few cases we have, a formal statistical analysis is only possible at a 
rudimentary level. It would be desirable to have additional variables and more 
disaggregated data. Nevertheless, we present the available data and add tentative 
discussion of possible inferences.  
The first factor that may explain different sanction frequencies is the control frequency 
(i.e., the average number of controls per operator and year). During the period of analysis, 
those CBs that imposed significantly more sanctions (i.e., CB 4 and CB 5) showed a 
lower control frequency than the other CBs. This result does not support the conventional 
assumption that more control visits lead to higher detection rates, indicating that there 
may be unobserved intervening factors. 
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Table 2.6 Determinants that could explain differences in control results between the most extreme 
CBs with regards to sanction frequency (ordered by decreasing sanction frequency; own 
calculations, based on data from the BLE for the years 2006 to 2008).  
 
Number of severe 
sanctions per 1,000 
operators 
Number of controls 
peroperator 
Share (%) of 
unannounced 
controls 
Share of farm 
operators in all 
controlled 
operations 
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CB 4 12.2 14.7 0.0 8.9 1.16 1.06 0.99 1.07 15 1 2 6 80 76 75 77 
CB 5 3.3 6.5 12.8 7.5 1.09 1.13 1.11 1.11 11 10 10 10 75 73 71 73 
CB 6 2.2 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.14 1.20 1.13 1.15 12 11 12 11 69 64 63 65 
CB 3 3.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.10 1.28 1.30 1.23 6 15 14 12 46 36 40 41 
All nine  
large CBs 4.0 4.0 2.7 3.6 1.14 1.16 1.14 1.15 12 10 12 12 68 64 63 65 
 
Second, analysis of the share of unannounced control visits among all controls reveals 
that the CBs that imposed significantly more sanctions than others performed 
unannounced controls less often than other CBs did. Again, this result does not support 
the widespread argument that unannounced control visits are an effective instrument to 
ensure organic integrity.  
Third, turning to the structure of CB clients, the area of production must be compared 
with respect to the ratio between the share of sanctions imposed and the share of 
operators (i.e., the share of sanctions in relation to the share of operators). During 2007 
and 2008, farm operators and especially importers were sanctioned relatively frequently, 
whereas processors and other types of operators were sanctioned relatively rarely. The 
overall share of importers is relatively small; accordingly, the share of farm operators is 
more influential. The share of farmers controlled is above the average for the CBs that 
sanctioned more frequently.  
The analysis of these three factors is backed by a correlation analysis based on Kendall’s 
tau. Significant correlations between these factors and the sanction frequency were not 
detected. Strictly speaking, this means that the hypothesis of a relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the sanction frequency must be rejected. Therefore, the 
variables investigated do not contribute to explaining the differences in sanction 
frequencies. However, the high aggregation level of the data and other factors discussed 
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above (not reflected in the data) might be important for this result. As such, both 
explanations deserve closer attention.  
2.7 Discussion 
The data analysis shows that these official data are not sufficient to fully assess the 
European organic control system. The data were useful for assessing the fulfilment of 
some minimum requirements, such as the number of controls, and it was also possible to 
use the data to assess whether large CBs act differently with respect to sanction 
frequency. However, the data were not suitable for assessing why the sampled CBs were 
different. This is a major shortcoming given the possibility of adverse selection.  
The data suffered from problems such as missing definitions of key terms (particularly 
“infringement” and “irregularity”), and the non-compliance data seemed to be affected by 
changing variable definitions over time. 
When discussing the results of this analysis with CBs and representatives from the 
involved authorities, it became apparent that some CBs did not report all sanctions for the 
operators they controlled to the BLE; some sanctions (i.e., those according to Reg. (EC) 
No. 29092/91, Article 9(9)b) were imposed by the competent authorities. The CBs argued 
that these sanctions were known by the organic system administration (on the Länder 
level), and thus, they did not need to report them to the BLE (federal level), which 
collects data for supervision. This might be a specific German problem resulting from the 
federal organisation of the control system that could easily be alleviated by instructing the 
CBs accordingly, as has been done recently. Supervision at the European level would be 
severely hindered if the most severe sanctions are only partially reported.  
When we compared the official data reported to the European Commission with the 
primary data from one of the nine large CBs, differences became evident because of false 
reporting in the year 2008. The false reporting was quite obvious but went unnoticed by 
both the CB and the BLE. It appears that not all opportunities to verify and correct the 
provided data were used.  
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2.8 Conclusion  
Our analysis shows that the data collected are not sufficient to explain the differences 
revealed among CBs. Unfortunately, these data do not cover important factors that may 
affect the control results. Specifically, little is known about the controlled operators. A 
future line of research could be based on data from individual operators, which are 
available only from CBs. Such research could contribute to a better understanding of the 
feasibility and usefulness of adding data to supervision reporting.  
At the European level, it seems important to clearly define the central terms of the organic 
regulation. Similarly, elements of training and organised communication among 
competent authorities at the European level could contribute to fewer differences in the 
implementation of the organic regulation.  
Generally, the use of the supervision reports seems to be limited, possibly because of the 
data structure and quality. The motivation of CBs to provide data could be improved if 
they realised that the data are actually used. 
Based on the available reports, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are significant 
differences in the attitudes and rigour of German organic farming CBs, which could lead 
to adverse selection in the long run.  
This case study on German data highlights elementary shortcomings in the supervision 
quality of organic certification. The implementation of a sophisticated supervision of 
organic control systems at the national and European levels requires resources, especially 
initially. Despite the costs, this investment is essential for building consumer trust in the 
growing organic market. 
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3 An analysis of the risks of non-compliance with the European 
organic standard: a categorical analysis of farm data from a German 
control body1 
Authors: Alexander Zorn, Christian Lippert, Stephan Dabbert  
Abstract: This paper quantitatively analyses the risk of non-compliance with European 
regulations on organic farming in Germany. Based on the economics of crime, we derive 
hypotheses regarding the factors that are expected to influence non-compliance. We use a 
data set from an important organic control body that contains farm and control data for 
the period from 2007 to 2009. Ordinal logistic regression models are used to test our 
hypotheses. The following characteristics of organic farms significantly increase the 
probability of non-compliance: short organic farming experience, farm size and the 
existence of conversion area.  
Keywords: Organic farming, economics of crime, non-compliance, risk-based controls, 
ordinal logistic regression model.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Organic farmers in Europe are subject to the European organic regulation (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on organic production and labelling of organic products). 
This regulation specifies the production rules for organic operators and the basic control 
procedures that operators (i.e., farmers, processors, retailers, and importers) undergo. 
According to the European organic regulation, the control frequencies of individual 
operators should result from the ‘risk of occurrence of irregularities and infringements’ 
(Art. 27 (3) of the European organic regulation)2. In the context of organic food quality, a 
risky operator is an operator that has a relatively high probability of severe non-
compliance with the organic regulation, and this level of non-compliance affects a 
product’s organic integrity. The above-mentioned Article 27 refers to the concept of risk-
based controls; this concept is ubiquitous in debates regarding the quality and further 
development of food control systems. Generally, risk-based control systems enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of controls by prioritising and directing resources toward 
relatively risky operators (Jahn et al., 2005; Albersmeier et al., 2009). 
In this article, we estimate the probabilities of sanctions by employing an ordinal 
logistic regression model that uses data that were collected by a German organic control 
body (CB) for farms between 2007 and 2009. Extending the qualitative risk classification, 
that is currently applied by some CBs, to a quantitative approach using categorical data 
analysis can contribute to enhancing the concept of organic risk-based controls. In this 
way, the organic control system in Europe could be improved with more effective and 
efficient controls.  
The following section provides an overview of the literature on risk-based approaches 
in food inspection schemes. Section 3.3 introduces the theory underlying the following 
statistical analyses and the derived hypotheses. Section 3.4 illustrates and describes the 
methodology and data that are employed in this study. Finally, section 3.5 presents the 
results and related discussion.  
                                                 
2  The European organic regulation relates the term ‘risk’ to the ‘risk of occurrence of irregularities and 
infringements’ without providing a detailed definition. However, the sanctions following from an 
irregularity – ‘the control body shall ensure that no reference to the organic production method is made 
in the labelling’ – and an infringement – ‘the control body shall prohibit the operator concerned from 
marketing products which refer to the organic production method’ (Art. 30 (1) of the European organic 
regulation) – suggest a limitation of risk-based inspections to severe non-compliance. 
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3.2 Literature review  
Food safety risks and risk-based control approaches in general have been described and 
analysed by international organisations (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 2006; Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2011) and in the scientific literature 
(Jahn et al., 2005; Albersmeier et al., 2009; Hoffmann, 2010). Research that specifically 
examines the implementation of risk-based control systems in organic certification is 
sparse (Jahn et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2008; Fischer and Neuendorff, 2009). However, a 
number of articles highlight the relevance and expected efficiency gains from risk-based 
food control systems for the organic sector. An interesting source on the topic is the 
international professional journal on organic certification, The Organic Standard, in 
which some articles on organic risk-based controls have been published. Rundgren (2004) 
noted that risk-based control approaches had previously been practised in organic 
certification. These approaches had to be terminated as a result of the standardisation of 
inspection procedures and regulatory requirements. In recent years, different European 
organic control bodies have accumulated experience with risk-based approaches (TOS, 
2006). Recently, Rundgren highlighted the requirement of risk-based controls in the 
European organic regulation, but he concluded that there has been ‘little progress on this 
to date’ (Rundgren, 2010). A German handbook for control bodies suggests a procedure 
for a risk-based control approach: operations can be categorised into three risk classes 
according to seven parameters (Fischer and Neuendorff, 2009).  
As a result of contacts with the organic certification sector, we conclude that control 
bodies currently apply simple quantitative methods in combination with qualitative 
assessments to categorise operators into risk classes (Fischer and Neuendorff, 2009; Piva, 
2010; Rundgren, 2010). These simple approaches have the advantage of being cost-
efficient, comprehensible, and easily realisable. When examining food quality 
certification in general, Albersmeier et al. (2010) refer to financial auditing and suggest 
an adapted audit risk approach. These authors indicate the importance of the analysis of 
control data and suggest a central database to monitor the certification system at the 
‘standard owner’ level. European organic control bodies collect and store a substantial 
amount of data pertaining to their operators, control visits, and non-compliance and 
sanctions. These data create the potential for sophisticated quantitative risk analysis 
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approaches. To our knowledge, this potential has not yet been exploited in the scientific 
literature or by the control bodies themselves.  
3.3 Theory and derived hypotheses  
The economics of crime approach indicates that opportunistic individuals consciously 
choose whether to comply with a law based on rational decisions: an opportunistic 
individual compares the total pay-offs of these two alternatives (Eide, 2000). The 
credence characteristic of organic food leaves room for opportunism and cheating, as 
buyers of organic products cannot verify the organic quality (Ward et al., 2004). Adapting 
Becker’s model on the supply of offences (Becker, 1968) to organic farming, one could 
argue that non-compliance with an organic standard by a rational operator is determined 
by the income that results from non-compliance, the detection probability, and the penalty 
in case of a sanction. Moreover, time preference can be an influential factor in the 
decision of whether to comply3. Farm characteristics constitute the focus of our analysis, 
as these characteristics are important determinants of farm income. Factors that influence 
farm income include compliance costs, quantity produced, and price obtained.  
Complying with an organic standard is costly: generally, one must be informed about 
the rules of an organic standard. The guidelines of organic standards usually constrain the 
application of certain inputs or methods, and such constraints result in higher production 
costs (Ward et al., 2004). Harvest yields are usually lower in organic farming. Organic 
food prices generally exceed conventional food prices (Mäder et al., 2002). The 
opportunities for manipulation during production, processing, and marketing are manifold 
(Giannakas, 2002) and may be associated with varying degrees of intention from laxness 
to severe fraud. Laxness can be understood as a behaviour that reduces the costs of 
compliance and thus only differs from intentional fraud in terms of degrees. Finally, the 
personalities of farmers and their employees may also influence farm income. Personal 
traits and preferences are related to a person’s risk aversion, which is particularly relevant 
for the propensity to behave opportunistically. This summary of information constitutes 
the theoretical framework on which the following hypotheses are based.  
                                                 
3  It is important to consider situations in which actions occur in the ‘self-enforcing range’ (Klein, 1985). 
Such a situation occurs when the discounted future income losses resulting from fraud and its detection 
exceed the short-term profit from cheating. 
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Fundamentally, compliance costs, risk behaviour, and farm income depend on farm 
and farmer characteristics. A farmer’s age may have an influence that results from age-
based differences in risk aversion (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001). Sex may also have an 
effect; studies revealed that women are more averse to risk (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 
2002). We expect that experienced organic farmers have higher compliance rates than 
inexperienced farmers for two reasons. First, the information and compliance costs of 
inexperienced farmers are higher as a direct result of their lack of experience. Second, we 
attribute a greater commitment to organic farming and its standards to experienced 
farmers (McCarthy et al., 2007; Best, 2008)4. Furthermore, the existence of long-term 
trade relationships and the costly development of a valuable reputation, which would be 
lost in situations in which opportunism is detected, could contribute to higher compliance 
rates. The affiliation of a farm with an organic federation and its adherence to the stricter 
additional standards of such federations is another proxy for commitment to organic 
farming rules. Such an affiliation could also affect compliance rates because of social 
control aspects that entail a higher detection probability for non-compliance cases.  
Henson and Heasman (1998) identified the size of an operation as a key factor for 
compliance with food safety regulations. They concluded that ‘large firms are generally 
more able to comply’. Economies of scale in quality management activities (Holleran et 
al., 1999) may matter in this context. Moreover, better compliance of large firms could 
result from relatively higher incomes at stake. Finally, the location of farms may affect 
compliance rates: natural conditions determine potential agricultural production (e.g., low 
site or soil quality only allows for extensive production methods with fewer inputs). 
Hence, extensive production may be accompanied by higher compliance rates. In 
Germany, there is a negative correlation between soil quality and the share of organically 
farmed land (Schmidtner et al., in press). A higher share of organic farms may have 
positive effects on the information that farmers possess and increased social control 
effects, both of which result in a higher compliance rate. A farmer’s personal financial 
situation and that of his farm could also influence his compliance behaviour: higher 
liquidity is associated with lower time preference that leads to a higher compliance rate. 
In other words, when a farmer has serious liquidity problems, he will be more inclined to 
cheat because he must earn money immediately. 
                                                 
4  These hypotheses are similarly relevant for the characteristics of employed farm workers.  
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Farm products can have diverse influences on compliance. Information and 
compliance costs can differ among various products because, for example, various types 
of crops are regulated differently (amount, level of detail, and complexity of rules). 
Marketability and prices differ across crops and different points in time. These factors 
may influence the likelihood of cheating. Production intensity can be an important factor 
with regard to compliance: in organic farming, many agricultural production inputs that 
are common in conventional agriculture cannot be used. The abandonment of 
conventional inputs usually results in lower yields and can lead to higher production 
costs. This aspect is especially relevant for intensive forms of agricultural production, 
such as fruit and vegetable production. Intensive organic production is usually more 
challenging because of difficult production conditions (e.g., more prone to illness, higher 
nutrition demands, or more labour intensive). In intensive areas of crop production (e.g., 
fruit growing or vegetable gardening) and husbandry (e.g., pigs or poultry), we expect 
lower compliance rates. In contrast, higher compliance rates are expected in extensive 
areas with fewer products traded within markets, such as pasture, set-aside areas, and 
sheep and goat husbandry. The existence of additional processing activities on a farm 
increases operational complexity and could therefore also contribute to higher non-
compliance rates. The effects of crop and livestock production on compliance can vary 
between years because of seasonal production difficulties and market developments that 
may affect farm production and liquidity.  
Sanctions and corrective measures in previous years may have both a learning effect 
and a deterrence effect. However, prior sanctions could also indicate that a farmer has 
been particularly prone to non-compliance because of limited skills or careless attitudes 
that translate into higher compliance costs. Therefore, we hypothesise that previously 
observed non-compliance may decrease or increase the current sanction probability. For 
an overview on the factors hypothesised to affect non-compliance, the available proxy 
variables and their direction of action, see Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 Factors that are hypothesised to influence non-compliance, the direction of influence 
expected, and available proxy variable(s) 
Factor Proxy variable(s)  
Hypothesised influence 
on non-compliance 
Overall characteristics of farms and farmers  
A farmer’s personal 
characteristics, such as time 
preference, age, sex, risk 
aversion, and reputation  
Lagged sanctions ↗ ↘ 
Organic farming and control 
experience 
Control contract duration with current CB  ↘ 
Commitment to organic 
principles 
Number of other certification schemes; 
Control contract duration with current CB 
↘ 
↘ 
Social control aspects Number of other certification schemes ↘ 
Farm size  Farmed area (in km²) ↘  
Parallel production Conventional area;  
Conversion area 
↗ 
↗ 
Complexity of business 
operation 
Farm is controlled for processing activity; 
Dummies for animal husbandry 
↗ 
↗ 
Sanctions in previous years  Lagged sanctions ↘ (learning effect) 
Farm location (natural 
conditions and proximity to 
other organic farms) 
 –  
(no suitable proxy variables included in 
the data set) 
 
Farm production characteristics  
Intensive crop production  Crop dummies for  
• Fresh vegetables 
• Fruits including wine grapes 
 
↗ 
↗ 
Extensive crop production  Crop dummies for  
• Unutilised and/or fallow land 
• Permanent grassland 
• Green fodder from arable land 
• Dried pulses 
 
↘ 
↘ 
↘ 
↘ 
Intensive husbandry Livestock dummies for 
• Poultry husbandry  
• Pig husbandry 
 
↗  
↗ 
Extensive husbandry Livestock dummy for 
• Sheep and/or goat husbandry  
 
↘ 
Notes: ↘ - decreasing effect on non-compliance; ↗ - increasing effect on non-compliance. 
 
In this paper, we focus on the effects of farm characteristics on compliance. Other 
factors that may influence the detection of non-compliance, such as the interpretation of 
the regulation by the supervising authority, the rigidity of a specific inspector or the type 
of control (e.g., it is generally assumed that unannounced controls lead to higher detection 
rates) are not considered in this study.  
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3.4 Methodology and data  
Adapting the definition of risk from the Codex Alimentarius Commission (related to food 
safety) to the context of organic food integrity, we defined risk as a function of the 
probability of an adverse effect on organic integrity and the severity of this effect (Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 2011). We used the sanction that is imposed on an operator as 
a proxy for risk. The sanction levels that are defined in Germany reflect the severity of 
the underlying non-compliance.  
Preliminary analyses for the models were conducted using bivariate analyses based on 
contingency tables and adequate independence tests (G-test and Fisher’s exact test) 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Furthermore, the potential independent variables to be 
used in the models were checked for multicollinearity (Chatterjee et al., 2000). 
Multicollinearity is a relevant concern because certain types of agricultural production 
tend to be linked to one another (e.g., grassland farming to dairy production).  
The dependent variable in our analysis is the type of sanction that is issued to 
operators. We have different categories of sanctions in our data (i.e., sanction is a 
categorical variable). Different regression models use the available data to specific 
degrees. A logistic regression model can be used to explain binary outcomes; thus, in our 
example, we would model whether an operator was sanctioned. This model is appropriate 
to explain the sanction probability globally without regard for the severity of a sanction 
(Urban, 1993; Long and Freese, 2006).  
An ordinal logistic regression model also considers the severity of a sanction. 
Compared with a binary logistic model, an ordinal logistic regression model uses the 
information that is provided by the sanction data more comprehensively. Because of the 
ordered character of the sanction categories in our data set, such a model can be applied. 
The ordinal logistic regression model is based on the assumption of parallel regressions 
(i.e., the slope coefficients for different outcomes of the dependent variable are identical). 
This modelling approach implicitly assumes that different sanction categories identically 
depend on the same influencing factors. This parallel regression assumption is frequently 
violated in practical applications (Urban, 1993; Long and Freese, 2006).  
We utilised data for three calendar years (i.e., 2007, 2008, and 2009) for which we 
estimated three separate cross-sectional ordinal logit models. The risk of non-compliance 
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was approximated by the most severe sanction5 imposed. The seven distinct sanction 
categories in the German organic control system are structured hierarchically and hence 
can be considered ordinal variables (Agresti, 2002). The rare occurrence of severe 
sanctions can result in estimation problems in the absence of variation between the 
dependent and independent variables. Therefore, the seven sanction categories were 
grouped into three classes of sanction severity that were used as dependent variables in 
the models.  
The ordinal logistic regression model is based on the structural equation of the binary 
logit model (Long and Freese, 2006): to model the general risk of a sanction, we assume a 
latent or unobserved dependent variable y* with -∞ < y* < +∞ that is associated with the 
independent variable x through the following equation:  
𝑦𝑖
∗ =  𝑥𝑖  𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖        (3.1) 
where 
yi* is the latent dependent variable for observation i, 
xi is the row vector of independent variables for observation i, 
β is the column vector of coefficients to be estimated, and 
εi is the random error of observation i. 
The latent variable yi* is associated with the observed variable y through the following 
equation: 
*
*
*
1 0
0 0
i
i
i
if y
y
if y
 >
= 
≤
       (3.2) 
The difference between the binary logit and ordinal logistic models is that for the latter 
the observed variable y is a polytomous variable: in our study, the observed variable is 
given by the most severe sanction that is imposed on a farm operation in a specific year 
and includes ‘no sanction imposed’ (j = 0) and the seven following gradual sanction 
categories that we merged into three additional categories:  
  
                                                 
5  This variable is defined by the most severe sanction category that may be imposed on a farm. The 
frequency of such a sanction is not relevant.  
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• written indication (j = 1);  
• explicit documentation and obligatory information (j = 1);  
• sanctioned control visit (j = 1);  
• warning (j = 2);  
• provisional prohibition of organic marketing due to suspicion (j = 3);  
• prohibition of organic marketing related to individual batches (j = 3);  
• prohibition of organic marketing in general for a certain period of time (j = 3).  
Thus, the measurement model for the J = 4 (j = 0, ..., 3) ordinal outcomes is as 
follows:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚     if 𝜏𝑚−1  ≤ 𝑦𝑖∗  ≤  𝜏𝑚     with 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝐽 .  (3.3) 
with J-1 cutpoints or thresholds 𝜏1 to 𝜏𝐽−1 to be estimated and delineating the sanction 
categories. The probability of observing y = m for a given x is defined as follows: Pr  (𝑦 = 𝑚 |𝑥 ) = Pr  (𝜏𝑚−1  ≤ 𝑦∗  ≤  𝜏𝑚 | x).    (3.4) 
Hence, the general formula for the predicted probability in the ordinal regression 
model can be derived as follows:  Pr  (𝑦 = 𝑚 |𝑥 ) = 𝐹  (𝜏𝑚 − 𝑥𝛽) −  𝐹  (𝜏𝑚−1 − 𝑥𝛽),   (3.5) 
with the cumulative density function F for ε (Long and Freese, 2006).  
For every year considered, the modelling began with the estimation of an unrestricted 
model. Subsequently, a restricted estimation via a backwards stepwise procedure at the 
p=0.1 level was performed. If a strongly correlated variable was part of the restricted 
model, then the effect of the correlation was tested by excluding the corresponding 
variable from the estimation. The final restricted model was estimated via backwards 
stepwise procedure at the p=0.05 level. For the evaluation and comparison of the resulting 
models, we referred to the likelihood ratio test (LR test), McFadden’s R² (Pseudo-R²), and 
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).  
The data that were used in the analysis were obtained from the database of a major 
German organic control body. The data cover the years from 2007 to 2009. Because of 
differences in data recording and to ensure consistent measurement, especially regarding 
lagged variables, we used data only for farms that were active in all three years of the 
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analysis. This approach results in a balanced panel data set. The data set consists of 1,421 
farms for each year and yields a total of 4,263 observations. During an average year, 47% 
of the farms were sanctioned (see Table 3.2 below).  
Table 3.2 Share of farms (in %) by the most severe sanction* imposed, 2007 – 2009 and totals 
Grouped sanction  
by severity  
Year 
  2007 2008 2009 Totals 
No sanction 50.04 53.48 56.65 53.39 
Grouped sanction 1 45.11 42.43 39.06 42.20 
Grouped sanction 2 2.60 2.60 3.38 2.86 
Grouped sanction 3 2.25 1.48 0.91 1.55 
Notes: * The variable ‘Most severe sanction imposed’ ranges from 0 to 3 and is given by the most severe of 
the grouped gradual sanction categories (cf. above). Number of farms in each year: 1,421.  
 
The distribution of the sanctions by severity reflects the gradual character of the 
sanction structure in Germany’s organic control system: slight sanctions (grouped 
sanction 1), such as written indications or obligations to improve documentation or to 
better inform the control body, account for approximately 90% of all sanctions. Severe 
sanctions (grouped sanction 3), such as (provisional) prohibitions on marketing products 
as organic and those that involve considerable potential financial consequences for farms, 
were rarely imposed. The share of severely sanctioned farmers decreased considerably 
over the period under consideration.  
Table 3.3 provides an overview of the dependent and independent variables that were 
used in the models. The displayed means of the crop and livestock variables (in the form 
of dummy variables) provide the share of farmers cultivating a corresponding crop or 
raising a respective livestock type. Due to the balanced data set, most variables do not 
vary considerably over the years under investigation.  
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Table 3.3 Summary statistics (means and standard deviations) of the variables that were used in 
the models for the period from 2007 to 2009 (n=1,421 in each year) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 
Most severe sanction imposed  
(from 0 to 3) 0.584 0.715 0.529 0.664 0.492 0.641 
Control contract duration (in 
decades) 0.737 0.354 0.837 0.354 0.937 0.354 
Number of other certification 
schemes 1 0.875 0.402 0.875 0.402 0.875 0.402 
Farmed area (in square kilometres) 0.430 0.851 0.427 0.804 0.434 0.796 
Conventional area 2 0.005 0.070 0.005 0.070 0.005 0.070 
Conversion area 2 0.336 0.472 0.343 0.475 0.341 0.474 
Cereals 2 0.526 0.499 0.545 0.498 0.548 0.498 
Dried pulses 2 0.110 0.313 0.125 0.330 0.129 0.335 
Root crops 2 0.155 0.362 0.157 0.364 0.164 0.370 
Industrial crops 2 0.172 0.378 0.117 0.321 0.113 0.317 
Fresh vegetables 2 0.213 0.409 0.202 0.402 0.194 0.396 
Green fodder from arable land 2 0.526 0.500 0.506 0.500 0.512 0.500 
Other arable land crops 2 0.027 0.161 0.023 0.148 0.023 0.148 
Permanent grassland 2 0.871 0.335 0.875 0.331 0.872 0.334 
Fruits (incl. wine grapes) 2 0.063 0.242 0.061 0.240 0.065 0.246 
Unutilised and/or fallow land 2 0.148 0.355 0.218 0.413 0.287 0.453 
Other and/or unknown crops 2 0.095 0.293 0.061 0.240 0.059 0.236 
Bovine husbandry 2 0.526 0.500 0.529 0.499 0.514 0.500 
Pig husbandry 2 0.146 0.354 0.150 0.357 0.106 0.308 
Sheep and/or goat husbandry 2 0.116 0.320 0.121 0.326 0.070 0.256 
Poultry husbandry 2 0.207 0.405 0.217 0.412 0.127 0.333 
Farm is controlled for  
processing activity 2 0.061 0.240 0.068 0.252 0.070 0.256 
Notes: 1 Other certification schemes refer to other organic certification schemes apart from the EU organic 
standard (e.g., certification under private standards, such as Demeter or Bioland).  
2 A dummy variable equal to 1 indicates that the attribute is present.  
 
3.5 Results and discussion  
The ordinal logistic regression models were calculated through maximum likelihood 
estimation using Stata 11. Table 3.4 presents the results of the yearly models and of the 
lagged models for 2008 and 2009. The latter models include a lagged sanction variable 
that represents the imposition and severity of a sanction in the previous year; all other 
data represent the year that is indicated.  
The upper portion of Table 3.4 shows the estimation characteristics. McFadden’s R² 
values are usually smaller than R² values in an ordinary least squares model (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 2000). However, the values in our models are small (all values are below 
0.1); this result indicates limited explanatory power. The LR test results for the restricted 
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models demonstrate that the coefficients of the models are significantly different from 
zero. The BIC can be used to compare nested models (Long and Freese, 2006). The 
inclusion of sanctions in the previous year in the models induced a considerable increase 
in the McFadden’s R² values for both of the corresponding models, whereas the BICs 
only slightly decreased, as the BICs also reflect the increased number of independent 
variables.  
Table 3.4 Model results of yearly models and lagged models for 2008 and 2009 (n=1,421 for each 
model) 
Model characteristics  2007 2008 2009 2008 lagged 2009 lagged 
McFadden’s R² 0.0437 0.0327 0.0596 0.0541 0.0720 
Likelihood ratio test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Bayesian information 
criterion  -7820 -7905 -7973 -7957 -8003 
Variable Estimated coefficients and significance level 
Control contract duration  -0.436 b -0.598 c -0.320 a -0.463 b  
Farmed area 0.166 a 0.329 c 0.185 b 0.287 c 0.133 a 
Conversion area 1 0.400 c 0.411 c 0.858 c 0.377 b 0.813 c 
Root crops 1   0.363 a  0.363 a 
Industrial crops 1 0.394 b     
Green fodder from arable 
land 1 -0.268 
a     
Other arable land crops 1 1.500 c 1.034 b    
Permanent grassland 1   -0.585 b  -0.586 b 
Unutilised and/or fallow 
land 1 0.383 
a     
Bovine husbandry 1 0.627 c  0.450 c  0.448 c 
Pig husbandry 1   0.455 a  0.408 a 
Poultry husbandry 1  0.472 c 0.724 c 0.439 c 0.609 c 
Farm is controlled for 
processing activity 1 0.505 
a     
Lagged sanctions 2    0.640 c 0.519 c 
Notes:  a p<0.05,  b p<0.01,  c p<0.001. 
1 A dummy variable equal to 1 indicates that the attribute is present.  
2 Lagged sanctions equal the most severe sanction that is imposed on a farm in the previous year and may 
range from 0 (no sanction) to 3 (severe sanction).  
 
The ordinal logistic regression model is based on the parallel regression assumption 
(also known as the proportional odds assumption). This assumption was rejected for the 
2007 model but was not rejected for any of the other models based on the Wald test that is 
suggested by Brant (Long, 1997). The Brant test facilitates global testing of the equality 
of the coefficients and that of individual variables. The violation of the parallel regression 
assumption for the 2007 model can be explained by the absence of any medium sanctions 
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observed in our data for the ‘processing activity’ variable in that year6. Interestingly, 
different sanction categories can be explained by the same variables, as the parallel 
regression assumption was violated only once because of a vacant sanction class. 
 Discussion 
The estimated coefficients cannot be directly interpreted and compared with one another. 
Therefore, we first consider the directions that are indicated by the algebraic signs: 
negative coefficients indicate a decreasing effect on the probability of sanctions, and 
positive coefficients indicate an increasing effect.  
The results of the five cross-sectional models support one another in the sense that no 
contradictory effects were discovered based on the direction of the signs. Some variables 
do not significantly contribute to the sanction probability. Several coefficients are 
significant only in a single year. This result is especially prominent for a variety of crop 
variables (root crops, industrial crops, green fodder from arable land, permanent 
grassland, and unutilised and/or fallow land), pig husbandry, and processing activities. 
Some variables are repeatedly significant: this result is especially relevant for overall 
farm characteristics, such as organic control experience, farmed area, and the presence of 
conversion areas. Livestock farming (bovine and poultry), other arable land crops, and the 
lagged sanctions variable are also repeatedly significant.  
The results of the regression models with respect to the hypotheses that we formulated 
in section 3.3 provide support for several hypotheses. First, according to the results, 
experience with organic controls clearly contributes to decreased sanction probability. 
However, the increasing effect of farm size on sanction probability contradicts the results 
that were obtained by Henson and Heasman (1998) and our respective hypothesis. The 
potential effect of increasing complexity (e.g., a division of labour that requires more 
organisation and communication) appears to be stronger. The existence of conversion 
areas causes sanction probability to increase, and this result is consistent with our 
hypothesis.  
Second, we contrasted the crop production characteristics with our hypotheses and 
prior considerations. The decreasing effects of permanent grassland farms and farms with 
                                                 
6  It is not astonishing that no medium sanction was observed because of the low number of farms with 
processing activities (n=87 or 6.1% of the sample) and the low number of operators on which medium 
sanctions were imposed (n=37 or 2.6% of the sample).  
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green fodder on the sanction probability are consistent with our expectations. Root crops 
and industrial crops have increasing effects on the sanction probability. These effects are 
plausible because the demands on the skills of farmers and the required agricultural 
activities and inputs for these crops are higher. The effects of the category ‘other arable 
land crops’ could not be further evaluated because of the vague definition of the included 
crops. The decreasing effect of farms with unutilised land on the sanction probability was 
surprising and can only be explained by unobserved interaction effects.  
Third, three livestock categories exhibit an increasing effect on sanctions: bovine 
animals, pigs, and poultry. This result is plausible because the presence of livestock on a 
farm entails additional production rules that must be considered (e.g., regarding indoor 
and outdoor areas, and medication). The significant effects of poultry and pig production 
are consistent with our hypotheses in view of the specific challenges in these production 
areas.  
Finally, the inclusion of lagged sanction variables resulted in highly significant, 
increasing effects on sanction probability. Hence, the hypothesis that there is an important 
learning or deterrence effect, that results from sanctions in the previous year, must be 
dismissed. As the control body uses present sanctions for the evaluation of non-
compliance risk for future controls (see below), this important result supports the 
approach of the control body.  
The data-providing control body uses a qualitative risk classification approach that 
consists of three risk classes (ranging from low (1) to high (3) risk). The risk 
classification is used to sample operations to determine additional future control visits. 
An important criterion that was used to classify the farms is the result of previous controls 
(especially the number and types of sanctions that were imposed). As mentioned above, 
the relevance of this criterion is supported by the results of the lagged models. The other 
criteria used for risk classification are parallel conventional production and specific risk 
crops (e.g., table grapes). However, these criteria were not confirmed by our statistical 
analyses.  
To explore the differences between the qualitative and quantitative risk classifications, 
we analysed the correlation between the 2008 classifications (risk classification of the CB 
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versus the estimated sanction probabilities of the unlagged model for 2008) and the 
sanctions that were imposed in 20097.  
As expected, the Pearson correlation coefficient between the risk classification of the 
control body and the degree of sanction is highly significant and positive, although the 
correlation is weak (0.2189, Table 3.5). The Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
most severe sanction and the four estimated sanction probabilities are also highly 
significant. As expected, the coefficient for the ‘No sanction’-group is negative, and the 
other coefficients are positive. All of these correlations are rather weak.  
Table 3.5 A comparison of the qualitative and quantitative risk classifications using Pearson 
correlation coefficients (n=1419) 
 
Most severe 
sanction (2009) 
CB risk classification 
(based on 2008 data) 
Number of 
controls (2009) 
Control body (CB) risk classification  
(based on 2008 data) 0.2189* 1  
Total number of controls in 2009 0.1773* 0.2320* 1 
Estimated probability of 'No sanction'  
(based on 2008 data) -0.2278* -0.2844* -0.1315* 
Estimated probability of 'Slight sanction'  
(based on 2008 data) 0.2208* 0.2693* 0.1321* 
Estimated probability of 'Critical 
sanction' (based on 2008 data) 0.1957* 0.2466* 0.1052* 
Estimated probability of 'Severe or 
extreme sanction' (based on 2008 data) 0.1014* 0.1492* 0.0467
a 
Notes: * Significant at the 0.001 level; a p-value of 0.0789.  
 
The method applied does not enable an evaluation regarding which of the two risk 
approaches is more accurate, but the method does provide support for both approaches. In 
general, the effect of a risk classification system is not easy to evaluate: operations that 
are classified as risky are more often controlled and perhaps even controlled more 
rigorously. Namely, the data that we analysed could already have been influenced by the 
risk perceptions and evaluations of the control body and inspectors. The degree to which 
this influence might be relevant is difficult to assess. This problem is illustrated by the 
correlation between the number of controls and the CB’s risk classification.  
The remarkable decline in sanctioned farmers, as illustrated in Table 3.2, coincided 
with the coming into force of the revised European organic regulation in 2009. One might 
be tempted to explain the decreased sanction frequency by referring to the revised 
                                                 
7  We could not perform similar analyses for 2008, as we did not have a risk classification from the CB for 
this year. 
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regulation. However, according to expert evaluations of the revision process, the revised 
regulation does not sufficiently explain this development. Few changes in production 
rules were observed (Plakolm, 2009), and the control measures were expected to remain 
constant in Germany (Neuendorff, 2009). The revision and the subsequent adaptation 
processes of the stakeholders may have induced the inspectors and control bodies to act 
more generously in the corresponding year. An alternative explanation might be that 
some unobserved factors (e.g., a changed population of inspectors) are responsible for the 
difference. 
3.6 Conclusion  
The organic certification sector is legally obligated to implement a risk-based control 
approach. Thus far, both simple and elaborate qualitative methods that may involve the 
‘gut instincts’ of inspectors have been applied. Although the discussion of risk-based 
controls has persisted for years and considerable expectations are connected to this 
approach, little systematic progress with regard to control effectiveness and efficiency has 
been achieved.  
Against this background, our contribution is based on a categorical analysis of data 
from an important German organic control body and analyses risk quantitatively in terms 
of sanction probabilities. The estimations provide reliable results, especially with regard 
to general farm characteristics, such as organic control experience, farmed area, and the 
existence of conversion areas for organic farming. However, the analysis of farm 
production characteristics (i.e., specific livestock or crop categories) does not yield clear 
results.  
The data that were used in the ordinal logistic models are based on farm and control 
data that are similar to those available from all or most European control bodies. Proper 
data collection and data management with risk-based analysis objectives are prerequisites 
for sound quantitative analyses. The inclusion of additional variables that have not yet 
been collected by control bodies could increase the utility of a quantitative risk-based 
approach. Such data could include information pertaining to the financial situation of a 
farm and personal data with respect to a farmer (age, education, and organic experience). 
To better capture seasonal effects, researchers could employ market data (to capture price 
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changes) and production-relevant climate data (to capture difficult production situations) 
to further enhance quantitative risk modelling. Some of these types of data are currently 
implicitly evaluated by inspectors who visit farms and communicate with farmers. 
Capturing these impressions is likely to represent an important advantage of qualitative 
risk assessment over quantitative risk assessment. The evaluation of these soft factors and 
the systematic incorporation of relevant proxies into the control databases could offer 
further benefits for risk-based controls.  
An ordinal logistic regression analysis allows for the modelling of different sanction 
categories. However, this method relies on the parallel regression assumption that is often 
violated in real-world data sets. Panel modelling could alternatively be applied in 
situations in which more extended time series data are available. This alternative would 
enable researchers to gain a clearer understanding of the effects of organic experience and 
to test for seasonal production and market effects. Count data modelling could also be an 
alternative method, although this type of modelling would need to rely on significantly 
larger populations because severe sanctions rarely occur.  
The applicability of a quantitative risk analysis requires both technical and 
methodological skills that are not usually available to a control body. Technical services 
are regularly provided by external professional service providers. The methodological 
skills that are applied in this analysis do not represent the core business of control bodies. 
However, in the long term, the integration of more developed methods into the database 
systems of control bodies may be feasible. Until this integration will be completed, we 
suggest strengthening the qualitative risk-based approach by further elaborating the 
quantitative risk analysis method and integrating this approach into control governance. 
The suggested approach is a promising means of deriving benefit from the potential 
effectiveness and efficiency gains that risk-based control approaches imply.  
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4 Econometric analysis of non-compliance with organic farming 
standards in Switzerland1 
Authors: Christian Lippert, Alexander Zorn, Stephan Dabbert  
Abstract Applying the economics of crime theory, we model the decision of an 
opportunistic and/or careless organic farmer and derive hypotheses to explain non-
compliance. Some of the hypotheses are tested against empirical data on farm 
characteristics and imposed sanctions as proxy variables for non-compliance in the years 
2007 through 2009 for organic farms certified by Bio Suisse. Random effects logit models 
show that processing activities and livestock diversity significantly increase a farm’s 
sanction probability. Past non-compliances also indicate a higher present sanction 
probability. Finally, we discuss some methodological issues and suggest a way to 
organise risk-based inspections more effectively. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Reliable and cost-effective certification is an important matter for consumers (cf., e.g., 
WARD et al., 2004) and producers (cf., e.g., SCHULZE et al., 2008) of organic produce, 
which is characterised by (credence) process qualities that are difficult to monitor (cf. 
JAHN et al., 2005). Hence, opportunistic producers may try to cheat by selling cheap food 
that is produced without adhering to the organic standard, at high organic market prices. 
Therefore, “repeat-purchase relationships and third-party monitoring are required for 
high-quality credence goods to be available” (MCCLUSKEY, 2000). The objective of this 
paper is to theoretically and empirically analyse non-compliance behaviour of organic 
farmers so as to elaborate starting points for a more effective risk-based inspection and 
certification of organic farms. 
The theory developed herein is based on the economics of crime approach2, the principles 
of which have been developed by BECKER (1974; 1976) and STIGLER (1970). For given 
standards, an economic model explaining organic farmers’ non-compliance should 
reproduce the following relationships: we suppose that the incidence of non-compliance 
with organic standards is affected, on the one hand, by farmers’ compliance costs. On the 
other hand, it is thought to be influenced by inspection frequencies and the closely related 
probability of detecting non-compliance as well as by deterring fines and further 
(indirect) sanctions resulting from marketing restrictions in the case of detected non-
compliance. Thus, similar to other cases of offences (cf. EHRLICH, 1974; EIDE et al., 1994; 
ANTONY and ENTORF, 2002), in our theoretical model, we assume a negative relationship 
between the incidence of non-compliance and perceived inspection frequency. 
In chapter 4.2, a theoretical model for the explanation of organic farmers’ non-
compliance is presented. From this model, hypotheses on the effects of non-compliance 
determining factors are derived. Chapter 4.3 contains a statistical analysis of some of 
these hypotheses. For this purpose, we rely upon 2007 to 2009 panel data on Swiss 
organic farmers’ characteristics and their compliance with Bio Suisse standards. Chapter 
4.4 offers a discussion of the results along with our main conclusions.  
                                                 
2  HERZFELD and JONGENEEL (2008, p.3ff.) provide a brief overview on the economics of crime approach 
with special regard to compliance in agriculture. For an application to food safety performance 
standards see LIPPERT (2002). 
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4.2 Theoretical model 
We assume that part of the organic farmers inspected by a control body will behave 
opportunistically. They will make only insufficient efforts to comply with a certain 
organic standard or even deliberately cheat in case the expected sanctions, which they 
have to fear when detected, are low when compared to compliance costs. As farmers’ 
individual risk attitudes are rather difficult to observe for a first approach, we assume 
risk-neutrality so that an opportunistic farmer’s change in expected profit is proportionate 
to the resulting expected utility change. However, the statistical analysis in chapter 4.3 
indirectly deals with farmers’ different attitudes towards risk as part of the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Consequently, similar to the approach by ALMER and GOESCHL (2008, 
p.6f.), an opportunistic farmer’s compliance decision is assumed to be described by the 
following condition: If 
 
(4.1) 
then NCit = 1, NCit = 0 otherwise, with 
H[.] = expectation of . 
t = time period (year) 
i = farm number (i = 1, …, n) 
B│. = net benefit given . 
NC = non-compliance (NCit = 1 if farmer i does not comply at time t, NCit = 0  
     otherwise) 
C = compliance cost saved when infringing upon the standard; these cost depend on 
s = site (location of the farm) 
fs = farm size (e.g., measured in UAA of the farm) 
ft = farm type (e.g., assessed by means of dummy variables for certain 
livestock activities or in case certain crops are cultivated) 
fe = farmer’s experience (e.g., measured in years of organic farming  
      practice) 
fl = farmer’s liquidity 
Pd = (subjective) probability of being detected in case of non-compliance depending  
    on s, fs, ft as well as on 
 IF = (perceived) inspection frequency and 
  IR = (perceived) inspection rigour (e.g., determined by inspection duration 
and accuracy observed during former inspection visits) 
Ps = probability of getting a sanction when being detected which depends on 
  SF = (perceived) sanction frequency in case of detected non-compliance 
F = fine related to the sanction (assumed to be given and constant over time) 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1[ 1] , , , , , , , , , , , 0it t i i i i i d i i i t t s t i i i i itH B NC C s fs ft fe fl P s fs ft IF IR P SF F L s fs ft d fl ε− − −= = − + + >
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L = present value of future profits lost due to sanction related marketing restrictions 
and reputation losses which depend on s, fs, ft as well as on 
  d  = discount rate (also influenced by the farmer’s liquidity fl) 
ɛit = error term reflecting further individually different cost and/or benefit 
determining factors, such as a farmer-specific risk premium, as well as a 
random error. 
 
It should be noted that costs, Ci, do not only contain (opportunity) costs directly resulting 
from compliance with the respective organic standards but also related information and 
transaction costs. These costs are individually influenced by every farmer i’s education 
along with her cognitive capabilities. Presented this way, a careless non-complying 
farmer who, at first glance, does not act opportunistically as she is not cheating 
consciously may, nevertheless, be perceived as behaving according to inequality (4.1). 
That is, being inaccurate, she implicitly evaluates cost, Ci, which, in practice, also 
includes all costs for obtaining information needed to be accurate, as exceeding the 
monetary value of expected sanctions. 
In addition to a farmer-specific risk premium (reducing ɛit), the term ɛit may also reflect 
an individually different monetary equivalent of a “warm glow” due to the positive 
feelings when complying with organic farming standards. For many well-informed 
farmers, this equivalent may be so important that they will always comply regardless of 
how costly it will be. Organic farmers consist of two subgroups. For non-opportunistic 
actors NCit is always zero, whereas for the other (the opportunistic) farmers, compliance 
behaviour is determined by the variables contained in inequality (4.1). 
In the case where a control body has already assigned the monitored farms to different 
risk classes subject to different inspection frequencies, the perceived inspection 
frequency, IFt-1, is a function of those variables that determined the corresponding 
classification (i.e., in inequality (4.1): IFt-1 = IFt-1(fsi; fti; .)). 
Let xijt be one factor among other factors that determines farmer i’s benefit of non-
compliance Bt|NCit=1 with a given organic standard. Then, for well specified direct and 
indirect sanctions, F and L, it follows from inequality (4.1) that as long as 
(4.2) 
an increase of the factor xijt entails 
1
0t it t
ijt ijt
B NC B
x x
∂ = ∂
= >
∂ ∂
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(i) a rising probability, P(NCit = 1), of farmer i infringing upon the considered 
standard and 
(ii) a greater total number, NCF, of non-complying organic farmers as inequality (4.1) 
will be positive for more opportunistic actors. 
Inequality (4.1) yields the following partial derivatives and corresponding hypotheses: 
(4.2a) 
 Hypothesis: P(NCit = 1) and the number of non-complying farmers, NCF, 
decreases with the probability of being detected in case of non-compliance; 
(4.2b) 
 Hypothesis: P(NCit = 1) and NCF decrease with the probability of receiving a 
sanction when detected; 
(4.2c) 
 Hypothesis: P(NCit = 1) and NCF decrease with a higher (perceived) inspection 
frequency at time t-1; 
(4.2d) 
 Hypothesis: P(NCit = 1) and NCF decrease with inspection rigour at time t-1; 
(4.2e) 
 Hypothesis: P(NCit = 1) and NCF decrease with (perceived) sanction frequency 
when detected at time t-1; 
(4.2f) 
 Hypothesis: P(NCit = 1) and NCF decrease with a farmer’s experience because it 
is assumed that the longer a person has farmed organically, the easier it 
will be for her to comply with the standard; 
(4.2g) 
 Hypothesis: P(NCit = 1) and NCF decrease with a farmer’s liquidity because it is 
assumed that it is less costly to bear present costs or to renounce to present 
( ) ( )( ). . 0t s
d
B P F L
P
∂
= − + < =>
∂
( ) ( )( ). . 0t d
s
B P F L
P
∂
= − + < =>
∂
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
. .
. . 0 0d dt s
t t t
P PB P F L because
IF IF IF− − −
∂ ∂ ∂
= − + < > => ∂ ∂ ∂ 
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1 1 1
. .
. . 0 0d dt s
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∂ ∂ ∂
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income from fraud when having more liquid assets today (i.e., ∂Ct(.)/∂fl < 
0) and because ∂L(.)/∂d(fl) and ∂d/∂fl are unambiguously negative; 
(4.2h) 
 Hypothesis: The direction of the effect of an increasing farm size on P(NCit = 1) 
and NCF is not clear. Whereas the second and third addend of (2h) are 
both supposed to be negative (∂Pd/∂fs > 0 because the bigger the farm the 
more opportunities to detect non-compliance and ∂L(.)/∂fs > 0 because the 
bigger the farm the more harmful the future marketing restrictions will be) 
it is unclear how ∂Ct(.)/∂fs will behave. It could be negative due to 
economies of scale, but it could also be positive because, with increasing 
farm size, there will be more costly aspects to observe and increased 
opportunities to make mistakes. 
 Hypothesis: Site s and farm type ft are categorical variables that may influence 
Bt|NCit = 1 (4.2i) 
As assumed in inequality (4.1), the detection probability Pd is affected by some of the 
variables explaining non-compliance; thus, a general problem arises when trying to 
estimate the discussed effects by means of discrete choice models (see chapter 4.3). This 
problem results from the fact that observed non-compliance, which is used to estimate the 
probability of non-compliance, is not the same as real non-compliance. This may be 
illustrated for constant detection probabilities Pd = Pd(t-1) = Pd(t) using farm size, fs, as an 
example. Neglecting ∂L(.)/∂fs and assuming ∂Ct(.)/∂fs = 0 and ∂Pd/∂fs > 0, it follows from 
(4.2h) that an increase in farm size leads to a reduced number, NCF, of non-complying 
farmers. However, what would be observed is the reported number, RNCF, of non-
complying farmers 
(4.3) 
Whereas in the example, the marginal effect of farm size on real non-compliance is 
(4.4) 
the observed marginal effect on reported non-compliance can be positive because in 
equation 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). .. . . .tt ds d s
C LB PP F L P P
fs fs fs fs
∂ ∂∂ ∂
= − + −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ), . , . , . , . , . .d d dRNCF P fs NCF P fs P fs= ⋅
( )( ), . , .
0,d d
d
NCF P fs PNCF
fs P fs
∂ ∂∂
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∂ ∂ ∂
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(4.5) 
the second addend on the right-hand side is greater than zero. In other words, the 
reduction of equilibrium non-compliances due to the deterring effect of a higher detection 
probability may be overcompensated by the increased number of detected and reported 
non-compliances. In this case, the conclusion that bigger farm size leads to more (true) 
non-compliance would be wrong. Note that the discussed problem is relevant for all non-
compliance explaining variables that affect not only C(.) and L(.) in equation (4.1) but 
also probability Pd. 
4.3 Statistical models to explain organic farmers’ non-compliance 
in Switzerland 
4.3.1 Data 
The following empirical analysis is based on data from the years 2007 through 2009 for 
inspections, sanctions and farm characteristics provided by an important Swiss organic 
certification body. Table 4.1 contains summary statistics of those available variables that 
are used for hypothesis testing in this study. For each of the years, 2007, 2008 and 2009, 
the number of clients from the considered certification body that showed at least some 
kind of organic farming activity was 4661, 4508 and 4387, respectively. 
In total, Table 4.1 covers data from 4831 farms, out of which 4215 farms were certified 
every year within the three year period. 215 farms were certified only in 2007 and 2008 
and 70 farms were listed for 2008 and 2009. Another 10 farms were lacking data for 
2008. The number of farms that were certified for only one of the three years, according 
to the dataset was 221 (2007), 8 (2008) and 92 (2009). 
On average, every farm was inspected approximately 1.06 times in 2007 (see Table 4.1). 
This value includes 1.01 regular annual inspections, 0.0006 follow-up visits in case of 
previous non-compliances and 0.046 unannounced controls. The corresponding figures 
were similar for the years 2008 and 2009. However, the number of unannounced visits 
increased slightly to 0.057 in 2009. 
  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
, . , .
, . , . , .d d dd d
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics for selected variables of Swiss organic farms certified by an 
important certification body 
 
a) Crop Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = farm i’s land for activity k divided by overall 
farmland of farm i (k = 1, …, 16 at maximum; activities according to Eurostat level 1 categories: cereals, 
root crops, permanent grassland etc.). - b) Livestock Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = 
farm i’s calculated livestock units for activity k divided by overall livestock units of farm i (k = 1, …, 7 at 
maximum; activities according to Eurostat level 1 categories: bovine animals, sheep, equids etc.). - c) 
relevant means farm i’s area or livestock units exceed a threshold corresponding to the first quartile of all 
data entries for the corresponding attribute within the considered three-year period. 
Source: own calculations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009 
In all three years, there were fewer slight and moderate sanctions (0.0159, on average, in 
2007) than severe or extreme ones (0.0429 per farm-operator in 2007). However, the 
mean severe and extreme sanctions per farm declined between 2007 and 2009, whereas 
the slight and moderate sanctions increased when comparing the respective values for 
2007 and 2009. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Year 2007   (n = 4661) 2008   (n = 4508) 2009   (n = 4387)
Total number of controls of a farm 1.05793 0.253033 1.06477 0.252384 1.06633 0.255222
Number of annual inspections imposed on a farm 1.01094 0.129742 1.01375 0.118368 1.00935 0.100859
Number of follow-up inspections imposed on a farm 0.00064 0.025365 0.00044 0.021061 0.00023 0.015098
Number of unannounced inspections imposed on a farm 0.04634 0.211265 0.05058 0.222173 0.05676 0.233369
Number of slight and moderate sanctions imposed on a farm 0.01588 0.126716 0.01309 0.117503 0.01892 0.147505
Number of severe and extreme sanctions imposed on a farm 0.04291 0.215005 0.03283 0.181909 0.02713 0.166625
Organic control experience in 10 years 1.15856 0.664391 1.24854 0.671525 1.32947 0.680487
Farm's agricultural area (UAA) in square kilometres (km2) 0.19504 0.181874 0.19252 0.148054 0.19901 0.168838
Farm is subjected to certification apart from Bio Suisse (yes=1) 0.95838 0.199745 0.96251 0.189978 0.97812 0.146318
Farm is also a processor (yes=1) 0.43553 0.495879 0.45075 0.497624 0.40415 0.490783
Shannon index for aggregated crop acreage a) 0.59056 0.308485 0.59859 0.304789 0.60165 0.30671
Shannon index for livestock b) 0.25235 0.310877 0.25333 0.314338 0.25262 0.315606
Farm cultivates GMO risk crops (soya or maize; yes=1) 0.02961 0.169520 0.02374 0.152241 0.02325 0.150715
Farm with relevant cereals, incl. rice (yes=1) c) 0.14782 0.354962 0.14707 0.354217 0.14862 0.355755
Farm with relevant dried pulses (yes=1) c) 0.01395 0.117277 0.01553 0.123654 0.01482 0.120832
Farm with relevant root crops  (yes=1) c) 0.07616 0.265289 0.07187 0.258305 0.07180 0.258191
Farm with relevant industrial crops  (yes=1) c) 0.03862 0.192704 0.04304 0.202958 0.04582 0.209112
Farm with relev. fresh vegetables, melons, strawber. (yes=1) c) 0.03454 0.182636 0.03660 0.187802 0.03761 0.190276
Farm with relevant green fodder from arable land (yes=1) c) 0.71315 0.452339 0.71806 0.449996 0.71917 0.449456
Farm with relevant other arable land crops (yes=1) c) 0.08453 0.278213 0.08385 0.277195 0.08799 0.283309
Farm with relevant permanent grassland (yes=1) c) 0.72796 0.445061 0.73159 0.443182 0.73672 0.440462
Farm with relevant fruit and berries (yes=1) c) 0.05707 0.232000 0.05812 0.233994 0.05904 0.235723
Farm with relevant grapes (yes=1) c) 0.02274 0.149096 0.02241 0.148012 0.02302 0.149992
Farm with relevant unutilised land (yes=1) c) 0.27784 0.447981 0.29791 0.457393 0.30294 0.459582
Farm with relevant other crops (yes=1) c) 0.01695 0.129095 0.01752 0.131229 0.01869 0.135449
Farm with relevant bovine animals (yes=1) c) 0.58314 0.493093 0.58119 0.493419 0.58491 0.492794
Farm with relevant pigs (yes=1) c) 0.08539 0.279490 0.07742 0.267283 0.07431 0.262305
Farm with relevant sheep (yes=1) c) 0.21090 0.407991 0.20963 0.407088 0.20903 0.406660
Farm with relevant goats (yes=1) c) 0.13838 0.345338 0.14907 0.356195 0.15364 0.360640
Farm with relevant poultry (yes=1) c) 0.31109 0.46299 0.29592 0.456505 0.28949 0.453578
Farm with relevant equids (yes=1) c) 0.13388 0.340557 0.13798 0.344914 0.14064 0.347692
Farm with relevant rabbits (yes=1) c) 0.04570 0.208853 0.04281 0.202457 0.03830 0.191929
Farm with relevant bees (yes=1) c) 0.02274 0.149096 0.02662 0.160986 0.02120 0.144064
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Table 4.1 also contains summary statistics for important potential explanatory variables. 
In 2007, the mean farm’s experience with the organic certification body, which provided 
the data, was approximately 11.6 years. The maximum experience reported by one farm 
(approximately 78 years, not shown in the table) could be a mistake or the result of a 
misunderstanding in the way that, in this single case, the corresponding farm’s experience 
in organic farming was given. Regarding the utilised agricultural area (UAA) in 2007, the 
smallest farm-operator cultivated 0.02 hectares, whereas the biggest farm consisted of a 
UAA of 450 hectares. Furthermore, in 2007 and 2008, 96% (98% in 2009) of the farms 
also participated in another certification scheme and between 40% and 45% reported a 
processing activity while up to 3% cultivated so-called “GMO risk crops” (i.e., soya or 
maize). 
Table 4.1 also contains the summary statistics for some crop and livestock dummy 
variables. For instance, the 2007 dummy variable farm with relevant bovine animals has 
to be interpreted as follows: 58.3% of the farms kept cattle and were among the 75% 
biggest cattle raising farms certified by the considered certification body in Switzerland. 
The Crop Shannon index is a measure for cropping diversity which simultaneously 
captures the number of crop categories cultivated and the shares of the crops in overall 
acreage. Similarly, the Livestock Shannon index is a measure for livestock diversity which 
simultaneously captures the number of animal species kept and the shares of the species 
in overall livestock units. 
4.3.2 Statistical models 
The main objective of our statistical analysis is to explain the probability P of detecting 
non-compliance with Bio Suisse organic standards in a certain organic farm. As there are 
only very few cases with more than one reported sanction per sanction category and year, 
we do not consider count data (Poisson regression) models. Instead, binary choice models 
will be estimated. As we are initially dealing with panel data, we estimate random effects 
logit models (cf. CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2010, p.625ff.; ALLISON, 2010, p.75f.). Fixed 
effects models, in this case, do not make sense because there is minimal variation in the 
explanatory variables within the individual farms (e.g., a farm raising cattle in 2007 will 
usually also keep cattle in 2008 and 2009). The latent-variable model underlying the 
following estimations is given by: 
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(4.6) 
where yit = 1 if at least one sanction of the considered sanction category was reported in 
year t, 0 otherwise. Models for the two different sanction categories in Table 4.1 are 
estimated. In doing so, the dummy variable sanction is taken as a proxy variable for a 
certain kind of reported non-compliance. To the extent possible, the explanatory 
variables, xjt, are chosen to test part of hypotheses (4.2a) through (4.2i) in chapter 4.2, 
while the influence of unavailable explanatory variables as well as of ɛit in inequality 
(4.1) is supposed to be captured by ωit. 
x1t =  organic control experience as the difference between year t and year of contract 
date divided by 10 as a proxy for the farmer’s organic farming experience, fe 
(expected sign of β1: negative, see hypothesis (4.2f))3; 
x2t  =  UAA in square kilometres as a proxy for farm size, fs (expected sign of β2: 
unclear, see (4.2h) and equation (4.5) in chapter 4.2); 
x3t = proxy variables for different farm types, ft, are obtained from available dummy 
variables (see Table 4.1; expected sign of β3 is dependent on farm types and sites; 
for the dummy variables farm is also a processor and farm cultivates GMO risk 
crops, the expected sign is positive as we believe that these attributes make non-
compliance more likely due to further sources of error; the two Shannon indices 
are expected to positively affect the sanction probability as well because an 
increase reflects a rising farm complexity); 
x4t  =  a dummy variable, which is one when a farm submits to at least one further 
certification apart from Bio Suisse (see Table 4.1; expected sign of β4 is negative 
as additionally certified farmers are expected to be more committed to organic 
farming – leading to a lower ɛit in inequality (4.1) –, to be better informed about 
all relevant standards – leading to lower cost, Ci, in inequality (4.1) – and to suffer 
from higher losses, Li, if not allowed to market their produce organically). 
                                                 
3  The respective time spans are divided by ten to obtain a variable, the standard deviation of which has an 
order of magnitude similar to the standard deviations of the other explanatory variables. Otherwise, 
problems with the estimation procedure could occur (cf. LONG and FREESE, 2006, p.77f.). 
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The effectiveness of unannounced controls is tested by adding the variable number of 
unannounced inspections imposed on a farm to the list of explanatory variables retained 
in the restricted models. 
Unfortunately, some of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical economics of crime 
model in chapter 4.2 cannot be tested as this would require a longer time series or further 
variables, such as testing the influence of liquidity assets, fl (see hypothesis (4.2g)), for 
which we did not have any proxy variable. 
Because we are dealing with random effects models, we will not know the effects αi of 
the individual farms, and it is impossible to predict the probabilities P(yit = 1|xijt; βj; αi); 
however, the sign of coefficient βj corresponds to the sign of the respective marginal 
effect ∂P/∂ xijt and the latter is also proportionate to βj (cf. CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2010, 
p.625f.). 
For the years 2008 and 2009, we also estimate cross-sectional logit-models with time-
lagged sanction variables as additional explanatory variables to examine whether the 
occurrence of non-compliance in the past increases the probability of present non-
compliance. A farm’s past non-compliance could signal higher compliance cost, lower 
losses, Li, risk friendly behaviour and/or lower commitment to organic farming. 
4.3.3 Results 
4.3.3.1 Slight and moderate sanctions 
First, we explain the dummy variable slight and moderate sanction via a backwards 
stepwise procedure with the possible explanatory variables in Table 4.1 (except variables 
on number of controls/inspections and number of sanctions). The restricted model, which 
contains only significant coefficients, is displayed in Table 4.2. Notice that a population-
averaged model with panel-robust standard errors and assumed time-lag independent 
(exchangeable) error correlation (cf. CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2010, p.624f.) results in the 
same significant variables and directions of the corresponding effects. 
Some of the explanatory variables considered in this analysis are significantly correlated, 
resulting in the occurrence of a multi-collinearity problem. The Shannon crop index and 
the Shannon livestock index are strongly correlated with some of the crop and livestock 
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dummies used. The same holds for the farms’ UAA, the control experience and, to a 
lesser extent, the processor dummy. Moreover, for a first approach, we use the available 
crop and livestock dummies shown in Table 4.1 as rough proxies for different farm types. 
However, we cannot provide a reasonable hypothesis for all significant dummies in Table 
4.2. For instance, we have no clear idea why farms with other crops, farms with unutilised 
land or farms with equids demonstrate a higher probability of non-compliance. 
Table 4.2 Random-effects logistic regression for slight and moderate sanctions (results of a 
backwards stepwise procedure with available potential explanatory variables) 
 
a) Crop Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = farm i’s land for activity k divided by overall 
farmland of farm i (k = 1, …, 16 at maximum; activities according to Eurostat level 1 categories: cereals, 
root crops, permanent grassland, etc.). - b) Livestock Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = 
farm i’s calculated livestock units for activity k divided by overall livestock units of farm i (k = 1, …, 7 at 
maximum; activities according to Eurostat level 1 categories: bovine animals, sheep, equids etc.). - c) 
relevant means farm i’s area or livestock units exceed a threshold corresponding to the first quartile of all 
data entries for the corresponding attribute within the considered three-year period. 
Number of observations = 13556; number of groups = 4831. - Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian; observations 
per group: minimum = 1, average = 2.8, maximum = 3. - Wald chi2(9) =  73.25; Log likelihood  =  -
1026.4081; Prob. > chi2  =   0.0000. - Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) =   11.42, Prob. >= 
chibar2 = 0.000. 
Source: own estimations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009  
For both reasons, that is, multi-collinearity and lack of hypotheses behind some dummy 
variables, we perform a second backwards stepwise procedure with a reduced set of 
explanatory variables excluding all crop and livestock dummies except the GMO risk 
crops and the permanent grassland dummy, both of which are justified by reasonable 
hypotheses. We expect a higher probability of non-compliance in the case of GMO risk 
crops and a lower probability for grassland farms that are expected to benefit less from 
forbidden pesticides. The corresponding results are displayed in Table 4.3. 
  
Slight and moderate sanctions imposed on farm (yes=1) Coef. Std. Err. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
Farm is subjected to certification apart from Bio Suisse (yes=1) -0.73187 0.324192 -2.26 0.024 -1.367277 -0.096469
Farm is also a processor (yes=1) 0.40622 0.158892 2.56 0.011 0.094801 0.717648
Shannon index for aggregated crop acreage a) -0.74380 0.351193 -2.12 0.034 -1.432125 -0.055476
Shannon index for livestock b) 0.77509 0.246653 3.14 0.002 0.291658 1.258517
Farm with relevant cereals, incl. rice (yes=1) c) 0.74241 0.232685 3.19 0.001 0.286359 1.198468
Farm with relevant other arable land crops (yes=1) c) 0.63973 0.267723 2.39 0.017 0.115004 1.164459
Farm with relevant permanent grassland (yes=1) c) -0.37083 0.168274 -2.20 0.028 -0.700643 -0.041021
Farm with relevant unutilised land (yes=1) c) 0.44884 0.162877 2.76 0.006 0.129603 0.768068
Farm with relevant equids (yes=1) c) 0.41389 0.209210 1.98 0.048 0.003848 0.823937
Constant -4.32055 0.408928 -10.57 0.000 -5.122029 -3.519061
/lnsig2u 0.37515 0.329971 -0.271578 1.021886
sigma_u 1.20632 0.199026 0.873027 1.666863
rho 0.30668 0.070161 0.188097 0.457860
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Table 4.3 Random-effects logistic regression for slight and moderate sanctions (results of a 
backwards stepwise procedure with selected potential explanatory variables) 
 
a) Livestock Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = farm i’s calculated livestock units for 
activity k divided by overall livestock units of farm i (k = 1, …, 7 at maximum; activities according to 
Eurostat level 1 categories: bovine animals, sheep, equids, etc.). - b) relevant means farm i’s grassland area 
exceeds a threshold corresponding to the first quartile of all data entries for grassland area within the 
considered three-year period. 
Number of observations = 13556; number of groups = 4831. - Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian; observations 
per group: minimum = 1, average = 2.8, maximum = 3. - Wald chi2(6) =  53.41; Log likelihood  =  -
1036.8699; Prob. > chi2  =   0.0000. - Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) =   13.12, Prob. >= 
chibar2 = 0.000. 
Source: own estimations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009 
Using a farm’s agricultural area as a proxy variable of farm size, we expect an effect, but 
due to theoretical considerations, we did not postulate a specific direction (see hypothesis 
(4.2h) in section 4.2). All other significant coefficients in Table 4.3 have the expected 
sign. Accordingly, a farm submitting to further certification bodies should be better 
informed and more committed to organic farming, thus making fewer mistakes, whereas 
farms with processing activities, farms with greater livestock diversity and/or farms that 
cultivate GMO risk crops are more likely to infringe upon one or more of the rules 
included in the organic standard. 
However, the fact that only a few farms are not subjected to further certification apart 
from Bio Suisse (see Table 4.1) is somehow problematical because the significant effect 
in Table 4.3 is based on merely 12 sanctioned farms without further certification (see 
Table 4.5). Moreover, using the number of further certification schemes rather than the 
corresponding 0/1-dummy in Table 4.3 results in a significant effect with the opposite 
sign (see Table 4.4), which is difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, the other effects remain 
stable even though the processor dummy is now only significant at the 10% level; 
therefore, it is not included in Table 4.4. The distribution of cases with different numbers 
of additional certification schemes apart from Bio Suisse among farms with and without 
slight and moderate sanctions is displayed in Table 4.5. 
Slight and moderate sanctions imposed on farm (yes=1) Coef. Std. Err. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
Farm's agricultural area (UAA) in square kilometres (km2) 0.69471 0.336718 2.06 0.039 0.034757 1.354665
Farm is subjected to certification apart from Bio Suisse (yes=1) -0.72996 0.324726 -2.25 0.025 -1.366407 -0.093505
Farm is also a processor (yes=1) 0.40025 0.155946 2.57 0.010 0.094605 0.705900
Shannon index for livestock a) 1.07210 0.216466 4.95 0.000 0.647834 1.496365
Farm cultivates GMO risk crops (soya or maize; yes=1) 0.73907 0.355261 2.08 0.037 0.042773 1.435372
Farm with relevant permanent grassland (yes=1) b) -0.52976 0.171982 -3.08 0.002 -0.866842 -0.192684
Constant -4.52911 0.393108 -11.52 0.000 -5.299587 -3.758634
/lnsig2u 0.45206 0.310617 -0.156733 1.060862
sigma_u 1.25362 0.194697 0.924626 1.699665
rho 0.32327 0.067953 0.206266 0.467549
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Table 4.4 Random-effects logistic regression for slight and moderate sanctions (results of a 
backwards stepwise procedure with selected potential explanatory variables) 
 
a) Livestock Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = farm i’s calculated livestock units for 
activity k divided by overall livestock units of farm i (k = 1, …, 7 at maximum; activities according to 
Eurostat level 1 categories: bovine animals, sheep, equids, etc.). - b) relevant means farm i’s grassland area 
exceeds a threshold corresponding to the first quartile of all data entries for grassland area within the 
considered three-year period. 
Number of observations = 13556; number of groups = 4831. - Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian; observations 
per group: minimum = 1, average = 2.8, maximum = 3. - Wald chi2(5) =  110.76; Log likelihood  =  -
1015.2241; Prob. > chi2  =   0.0000. - Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) =   5.30, Prob. >= chibar2 
= 0.011. 
Source: own estimations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009  
Table 4.5 Farms with different numbers of additional certification schemes apart from 
Bio Suisse among farms with and without slight and moderate sanctions a) 
 
a) Every farm is considered as one case in every year it was in the sample; therefore, in 2007, a farm can be 
assigned a 0, whereas the same farm is counted among cases with 1 in 2008. 
Source: own calculations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009 
Adding a dummy variable for unannounced inspections to the variables displayed in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively, and estimating two new random effects logit models 
yield, in both cases, a significant positive effect of unannounced controls (p=0.1%) on the 
occurrence of a slight and/or moderate sanction without relevant changes of the other 
coefficients. Hence, unannounced inspections seem to be effective (i.e., ∂Pd/∂IF > 0). 
Notice that there are no strong correlations between any of the potential explanatory 
variables shown in Table 4.1 and unannounced inspections. For this dummy variable, the 
highest point-biserial correlation is found for agricultural area (r=0.036), and the 
corresponding Pearson correlation coefficients are all below 0.04 even though 10 out of 
these 27 correlation coefficients are significant because of the high number of 
observations. 
Slight and moderate sanctions imposed on farm (yes=1) Coef. Std. Err. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
Farm's agricultural area (UAA) in square kilometres (km2) 0.62457 0.321456 1.94 0.052 -0.005472 1.254611
Number of certification schemes apart from Bio Suisse 1.37872 0.170205 8.10 0.000 1.045128 1.712319
Shannon index for livestock a) 0.96250 0.206564 4.66 0.000 0.557639 1.367354
Farm cultivates GMO risk crops (soya or maize; yes=1) 0.65914 0.342168 1.93 0.054 -0.011492 1.329780
Farm with relevant permanent grassland (yes=1) b) -0.46433 0.166556 -2.79 0.005 -0.790772 -0.137887
Constant -6.24275 0.324385 -19.24 0.000 -6.878535 -5.606970
/lnsig2u -0.10508 0.470953 -1.028136 0.817968
sigma_u 0.94881 0.223424 0.598058 1.505288
rho 0.21485 0.079445 0.098059 0.407845
Number of certification schemes apart from Bio Suisse
Slight and/or moderate sanction imposed on a farm 0 1 2 3 Total
Farms with no sanction (0) 447 12,233 643 26 13,349
Farms with at least one sanction (1) 12 135 60 0 207
Total 459 12,368 703 26 13,556
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For the years 2008 and 2009, two cross-sectional logit-models with time-lagged sanction 
variables as additional explanatory variables yield significant positive coefficients of the 
dummy variable slight and/or moderate sanctions in the previous year (backwards 
stepwise procedure with the initial set of variables used when estimating the model in 
Table 4.3, p=5.4% for 2008 and p=0.1% for 2009). However, as there are only 3 (5) cases 
with both a sanction in 2008 (2009) and one in the year prior, this result is obviously 
based on very few influential cases. Here, again, the problem is that the overall share of 
farms with slight and/or moderate sanctions is relatively small (see Table 4.1). 
4.3.3.2 Severe and extreme sanctions 
We explain the dummy variable severe and extreme sanction again by a backwards 
stepwise procedure starting with the same set of variables as for the case of slight and 
moderate sanctions. The final retained significant coefficients along with corresponding 
test statistics and further information are shown in Table 4.6. Notice that the variable, 
farm with relevant root crops, is not significant at the 10% percent level in the 
unrestricted model (then p=17.2%). 
For the same reasons as those given in the previous section, we do a second backwards 
stepwise procedure with the same reduced set of explanatory variables as the one used for 
slight and/or moderate sanctions. The resulting model is shown in Table 4.7. Again, we 
obtain the expected (in this case, highly significant) negative effect of being certified 
apart from Bio Suisse on the sanction probability. In this case, however, the sign of the 
effect does not change when replacing the dummy variable for further certification by the 
number of further certification schemes. 
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Table 4.6 Random-effects logistic regression for severe and extreme sanctions (results of a 
backwards stepwise procedure with available potential explanatory variables) 
 
b) Livestock Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = farm i’s calculated livestock units for 
activity k divided by overall livestock units of farm i (k = 1, …, 7 at maximum; activities according to 
Eurostat level 1 categories: bovine animals, sheep, equids, etc.). - c) relevant means farm i’s area or 
livestock units exceed a threshold corresponding to the first quartile of all data entries for the corresponding 
attribute within the considered three-year period. 
Number of observations = 13556; number of groups = 4831. - Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian; observations 
per group: minimum = 1, average = 2.8, maximum = 3. - Wald chi2(10) =  81.92; Log likelihood  =  -
1900.7385; Prob. > chi2  =   0.0000. - Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) =   68.40, Prob. >= 
chibar2 = 0.000. 
Source: own estimations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009 
Table 4.7 Random-effects logistic regression for severe and extreme sanctions (results of a 
backwards stepwise procedure with selected potential explanatory variables) 
 
a) Crop Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = farm i’s land for activity k divided by overall 
farmland of farm i (k = 1, …, 16 at maximum; activities according to Eurostat level 1 categories: cereals, 
root crops, permanent grassland, etc.). - b) Livestock Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = 
farm i’s calculated livestock units for activity k divided by overall livestock units of farm i (k = 1, …, 7 at 
maximum; activities according to Eurostat level 1 categories: bovine animals, sheep, equids, etc.). 
Number of observations = 13556; number of groups = 4831. - Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian; observations 
per group: minimum = 1, average = 2.8, maximum = 3. - Wald chi2(6) =  46.92; Log likelihood  =  -
1919.3791; Prob. > chi2  =   0.0000. - Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0: chibar2(01) =   76.89, Prob. >= 
chibar2 = 0.000. 
Source: own estimations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009 
Severe and extreme sanctions imposed on farm (yes=1) Coef. Std. Err. z P > z  [95% Conf. Interval]
Farm is subjected to certification apart from Bio Suisse (yes=1) -0.91967 0.225288 -4.08 0.000 -1.361225 -0.478114
Farm is also a processor (yes=1) 0.25291 0.116898 2.16 0.031 0.023790 0.482023
Shannon index for livestock b) 0.46257 0.212785 2.17 0.030 0.045522 0.879623
Farm with relevant root crops  (yes=1) c) -0.50377 0.247597 -2.03 0.042 -0.989048 -0.018486
Farm with relevant bovine animals (yes=1) c) 0.49332 0.124611 3.96 0.000 0.249091 0.737556
Farm with relevant sheep (yes=1) c) -0.39542 0.16539 -2.39 0.017 -0.719575 -0.071258
Farm with relevant goats (yes=1) c) 0.36557 0.159678 2.29 0.022 0.052611 0.678538
Farm with relevant bees (yes=1) c) 0.81177 0.287771 2.82 0.005 0.247747 1.375788
Year 2008 -0.29805 0.119975 -2.48 0.013 -0.533192 -0.062899
Year 2009 -0.47607 0.127602 -3.73 0.000 -0.726164 -0.225973
Constant -3.65556 0.275163 -13.29 0.000 -4.194867 -3.116249
/lnsig2u 0.69611 0.166326 0.370121 1.022108
sigma_u 1.41631 0.117785 1.203291 1.667048
rho 0.37878 0.039138 0.3056095 0.4579151
Severe and extreme sanctions imposed on farm (yes=1) Coef. Std. Err. z P > z  [95% Conf. Interval]
Farm is subjected to certification apart from Bio Suisse (yes=1) -0.90343 0.226249 -3.99 0.0000 -1.346869 -0.459990
Farm is also a processor (yes=1) 0.33037 0.118053 2.80 0.0050 0.098990 0.561748
Shannon index for aggregated crop acreage a) -0.43621 0.200246 -2.18 0.0290 -0.828682 -0.043733
Shannon index for livestock b) 0.40196 0.180206 2.23 0.0260 0.048762 0.755157
Year 2008 -0.28816 0.120073 -2.40 0.0160 -0.523495 -0.052819
Year 2009 -0.46196 0.127631 -3.62 0.0000 -0.712110 -0.211807
Constant -3.21566 0.274824 -11.70 0.0000 -3.754308 -2.677017
/lnsig2u 0.78068 0.159718 0.467635 1.093719
sigma_u 1.47748 0.117990 1.263414 1.727818
rho 0.39887 0.038296 0.326686 0.475737
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Corresponding to our hypotheses, both processing activities and livestock diversity affect 
the sanction probability positively, similar to the results found for slight and moderate 
sanctions. Interestingly, an increase in crop diversity leads to a lower sanction probability. 
The significant negative effects of the years 2008 and 2009 reflect the decline of severe 
and extreme sanctions over time (see Table 4.1). 
Regarding hypothesis (4.2f), in contrast to the models for slight and moderate sanctions, 
this time, we obtain the expected negative effect of certification experience. However, as 
this effect is not significant, the expected effect of the organic farming experience could 
not be confirmed. 
Again, adding a dummy variable for unannounced inspections to the variables displayed 
in Table 4.7 and estimating a new random effects logit model results in a positive effect 
of unannounced controls (p=8.5%). 
Finally, we estimate two cross-sectional logit models with time-lagged sanction variables 
as additional explanatory variables. By means of backwards stepwise estimation 
procedures with the same reduced set of initial explanatory variables used when 
estimating the model represented in Table 4.7, we obtain the results displayed in Tables 
4.8 and 4.9. 
Table 4.8 Cross-sectional logistic regression for severe and extreme sanctions in 2008 (results of 
a backwards stepwise procedure with selected potential explanatory variables) 
 
b) Livestock Shannon Index = – ∑ sharek·ln(sharek) with sharek = farm i’s calculated livestock units for 
activity k divided by overall livestock units of farm i (k = 1, …, 7 at maximum; activities according to 
Eurostat level 1 categories: bovine animals, sheep, equids, etc.). 
Number of observations = 4436; LR chi2(4) = 76.77; Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -596.8378; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0604. 
Source: own estimations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2008 
In both years, the incidence of a severe sanction in one or (for 2009) two previous years 
significantly increases the probability of being penalised in the considered year. In 
contrast, the lagged slight and moderate sanctions do not yield a significant effect. 
  
Severe and extreme sanctions imposed on farm (yes=1) Coef. Std. Err. z P > z  [95% Conf. Interval]
Farm is subjected to certification apart from Bio Suisse (yes=1) -1.26746 0.288494 -4.39 0.0000 -1.832893 -0.702019
Severe and extreme sanctions in 2007 (yes=1) 1.89529 0.226747 8.36 0.0000 1.450874 2.339707
Shannon index for livestock b) 0.47920 0.259406 1.85 0.0650 -0.029224 0.987631
Farm's agricultural area (UAA) in square kilometres (km2) 1.00335 0.375150 2.67 0.0070 0.268067 1.738628
Constant -2.73423 0.288397 -9.48 0.0000 -3.299481 -2.168986
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Table 4.9 Cross-sectional logistic regression for severe and extreme sanctions in 2009 (results of 
a backwards stepwise procedure with selected potential explanatory variables) 
 
Number of observations = 4227; LR chi2(4) = 38.48; Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -494.2983; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0375. 
Source: own estimations based on data from a Swiss organic certification body, 2007-2009 
4.4 Discussion and conclusions 
First, it should be noted that the apparent effectiveness of unannounced inspections could 
also be an effect of suspicion linked to information that an inspector received during her 
regular annual on-farm inspection visit or because of whistle-blowing or information 
from processors or traders. 
Next, the random effects models are based on the general assumption that farm-specific 
effects, αi, are independent of xijt (cf. ALLISON, 2010, p.76f.). If the random variable, αi, 
captures farm heterogeneity due to differences in farmers’ current liquidity, their risk 
attitudes, cognitive abilities or education (all unknown variables that may influence 
compliance behaviour), this assumption appears justified as there is no obvious reason 
why these characteristics should be correlated with one of the explanatory crop or 
livestock variables contained in Tables 4.2 and 4.6. However, αi may be correlated with 
the variable farm is subjected to [further] certification apart from Bio Suisse because this 
dummy variable could somehow capture commitment to organic farming and, hence, 
accuracy and skills in observing organic standards. In this case, the random effects 
estimators would be biased. 
As outlined in chapter 4.2, different farm types may be characterised by different 
sanction-related losses and compliance costs that lead to different compliance behaviours. 
Consequently, in the event of similar social damages resulting from non-compliance, 
inspections should be farm-type specific by opting for a higher unannounced inspection 
frequency for farm categories with an increased past non-compliance incidence. 
Severe and extreme sanctions imposed on farm (yes=1) Coef. Std. Err. z P > z  [95% Conf. Interval]
Farm is subjected to certification apart from Bio Suisse (yes=1) -0.89902 0.478655 -1.88 0.0600 -1.837162 0.039131
Farm is also a processor (yes=1) 0.47348 0.195036 2.43 0.0150 0.091219 0.855745
Severe and extreme sanctions in 2008 (yes=1) 1.23142 0.336485 3.66 0.0000 0.571917 1.890913
Severe and extreme sanctions in 2007 (yes=1) 1.25934 0.295033 4.27 0.0000 0.681089 1.837597
Constant -3.12995 0.471202 -6.64 0.0000 -4.053489 -2.206412
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In this context, two severe problems arise. First, the estimated effects of risk increasing 
farm attributes could be biased by attribute dependent inspection rigours and intensities 
reflecting inspectors’ prejudices or intuitions (i.e., a kind of a “confirmation bias”4). 
Second, one needs to be aware that the data on non-compliance frequencies are right 
censored as true non-compliances are very likely to lie above the observed (reported) 
non-compliances. Inevitably, the “dark figures”, that is, the number of unreported non-
compliances, will remain unknown. As has been presented in chapter 4.2, in cases where 
the detection probability depends on farm characteristics, this problem can bias 
conclusions regarding farm-type or size dependent incidences of certain non-compliances. 
The obtained significant effects must be placed in the context of this “dark figure” 
problem. Whether an observed higher probability of non-compliance for a certain farm 
type, ft (e.g., characterised by one of the dummy variables with positive coefficients in 
Table 4.6) is really due to the fact that the considered farm type is more prone to non-
compliance or whether this effect is merely due to better detection possibilities is an open 
issue. Only if we assume the detection probability Pd, in equation (4.1) to be independent 
of the attribute ft, we have observed significant effects on the true probability of non-
compliance. 
For instance, in the case of the significant negative effect of the participation in other 
certification schemes (apart from organic farming according to the Bio Suisse standards) 
on the sanction probability, the assumption of a detection probability independent from 
this attribute may be justified as organic farms, which are only Bio Suisse certified, are 
not necessarily characterised by specific production activities. Thus, it makes sense to 
suppose that farms that are not certified under additional schemes are more frequently 
non-compliers, as suggested by the statistical analysis, because for such farms losses, L, 
in inequality (4.1) may be lower.5 In contrast, the observed increased sanction probability 
of farms that are also processors may be mainly due to a higher detection probability in 
such farms. 
Assuming a farm-type independent detection probability, a strategy directing inspections 
towards farm types with a higher past non-compliance incidence would mean to direct 
                                                 
4  However, as reported in section 4.3.3.1, in our case, there are only relatively small correlations between 
the dummy variable for unannounced inspections and the significant explanatory variables found. Thus, 
there is no strong evidence for such a confirmation bias. 
5  However, in this context it should be noted once more that 96% of the certified farms (in 2009 even 
98%) were participating in further schemes. 
CHAPTER 4  Econometric analysis of non-compliance - Switzerland 
78 
inspections towards farmers who are truly more likely to infringe upon organic standards. 
However, even though it is merely a farm-type dependent higher detection probability 
entailing an increased non-compliance incidence, such a strategy would still be useful for 
directly avoiding more social damages resulting from non-compliance by withdrawing 
more faulty produce – which could cause damages or harmful scandals – from the market. 
As demonstrated by our statistical analyses, discrete choice models can be used to 
determine farm characteristics that increase the probability of non-compliance and/or the 
probability of detection. In practice, these models may be continuously re-estimated with 
the most recent data. A continuous update of corresponding discrete choice models for 
non-compliance incidences is all the more necessary as farmers’ expectations on future 
detection probabilities and sanctions are likely to be built upon observed past inspection 
and sanction frequencies. Hence, at some point in the future, they may change their 
compliance behaviour after a change in these frequencies. If so, control bodies should 
again adapt their inspection strategies. In our case, the dynamic character of the system is 
further illustrated by the decline of severe and extreme sanctions over time (see Tables 
4.1 and 4.7). This decline could be due to a changed inspection and sanction behaviour of 
the certification body (e.g., reduced inspection accuracy or rigour), but it could also be 
caused by an adaptation of farm operators who realised the strict controls during the 
previous years. 
Furthermore, in practice, control bodies can deliberately vary spot check inspection 
frequencies so that effects of increases in unannounced inspections (∂NCF/∂IFt-1) can be 
approximated for different groups of organic farmers. However, such a statistical analysis 
would need huge time series data. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the relatively low Pseudo R2 measures we obtain for 
the restricted models of our cross-sectional analyses indicate that important non-
compliance risk affecting variables are still lacking in the Swiss dataset used. According 
to our theoretical analysis, such variables could include information about farms’ site 
conditions as well as farmers’ liquidity situation or attitudes towards risk. Additionally, 
further individual characteristics such as education and skills may play a role. In our 
statistical analysis, such farm-individual attributes may be captured by the significant 
effects of past non-compliances. However, if such personal attributes were available, 
again it could easily be that estimated effects are biased due to attribute dependent 
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detection probabilities. For instance, if non-complying farmers with a higher level of 
education are smarter, it is likely that they will be caught less frequently than non-
complying colleagues with a lower level of education. 
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5 A heuristic model for optimizing the enforcement of organic farming 
standards1 
Authors: Christian Lippert, Alexander Zorn, Stephan Dabbert  
Abstract: This article theoretically analyzes strategies for the optimum enforcement of 
organic farming standards. Relying on economics of crime theory, the implicit decision 
calculus of opportunistic and/or careless organic farmers is modeled. Based on this 
calculus, a heuristic model to optimize inspection strategies is developed. The objective is 
to implement sanctions and inspection frequencies in a way that the net social cost arising 
from farmers’ non-compliance with an organic standard will be minimized. Net social 
cost depends on present and future social damages linked to non-compliance and on the 
cost resulting from control efforts. We analyze the interplay of important factors that need 
to be considered when planning inspection strategies. This analysis is performed using 
Monte Carlo simulations for several scenarios combining different damage functions, 
fines and compliance cost distributions. The simulations show that even without fines a 
situation can arise where a large proportion of operators comply. This can facilitate 
enforcement and reduce social cost. 
Keywords: Organic farming standard, enforcement, economics of crime, optimized 
control system 
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5.1 Introduction 
A heuristic model is a rule-based model that helps to better understand reality. It is built 
upon theory and information sources that are only loosely connected and would not 
qualify as a direct representation of reality. In our case, the purpose of such a model is to 
understand the interplay of important factors that determine non-compliance and to 
approach optimum inspection strategies. 
The objective of this article is to analyze enforcement measures designed to reduce the 
occurrence of non-compliance with an organic standard. Basically, this analysis must be 
accomplished by considering the compliance costs arising at the farm level, the possible 
social damages caused by non-compliance and the inspection and sanction efforts 
resulting from enforcement measures, which – in case they are effective – will influence 
the probability of detecting non-compliance. Hence, it must be taken into account that the 
incidence of non-compliance and related social damages can be influenced by deterring 
fines and further social sanctions as well as by inspection frequencies. 
First, in chapter 5.2, by applying the theory of economics of crime, the decision of an 
opportunistic and/or inadvertent farmer to comply with a certain process standard is 
modeled. Second, in chapter 5.3, a heuristic model is developed, which is built upon the 
calculus model from chapter 5.2, and then used to optimize a control body’s inspection 
strategy to reduce organic farmers’ non-compliance. In chapter 5.4, for selected 
functional relationships and parameter settings, optimum inspection strategies are 
discussed using a ceteris paribus analysis. Chapter 5.5 contains our main conclusions 
regarding the elaboration and continuous adaptation of appropriate inspection strategies. 
5.2 Theoretical model explaining organic farmers’ non-compliance 
Following the economics of crime approach2 established by BECKER (1976) and 
STIGLER (1970), an economic model explaining organic farmers’ non-compliance 
should reproduce for a given standard the main relationships between the factors 
mentioned in the introduction. Most notably, as in the case of other offences (cf. 
EHRLICH, 1974; EIDE, AASNESS AND SKJERPEN, 1994; ANTONY and ENTORF, 
                                                 
2  For an overview on the economics of crime approach with special regard to compliance in agriculture, 
see HERZFELD and JONGENEEL, 2008, p. 3ff. 
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2002), the long-term relationship between inspection frequency and incidence of non-
compliance should be negative. In addition, for other variables, sensible assumptions can 
be made regarding the direction of relevant effects. 
At least part of the organic farmers considered should behave opportunistically in that 
they will make only minimal efforts to comply with the given organic standard or will 
even consciously cheat if the expected sanctions, due to detected non-compliance, are 
considered low when compared with the compliance cost. In our model approach, the 
compliance cost also contains different individual efforts required to obtain all 
information that is needed to fulfill the considered standard. 
Hence, our starting point is from the perspective of a single organic farmer who tries to 
maximize her expected utility and who deliberately (i.e., opportunistically, in the original 
sense) or unconsciously (i.e., opportunistically due to carelessness) will infringe upon the 
standard when such action is deemed to be beneficial for her. For simplicity, our analyses 
are built upon the assumption of risk-neutrality. Thus, similar to the approach by ALMER 
and GOESCHL (2008, p.6f.), we assume a risk-neutral opportunistic farmer’s decision 
either to comply with a certain organic standard or not as determined by the following 
inequality. If 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1[ 1] ; ; ; ; , , , , , , , 0it t i i i i i d i i i t t s t i i i i itH B NC C s fs ft fe fl P s fs ft IF IR P SF F L s fs ft d fl ε− − −= = − + + >
 (5.1) 
then NCit = 1, NCit = 0 otherwise, with 
H[.] = Expectation of . 
t = time period (year) 
i = farm number (i = 1, …, n) 
B│. = Net benefit given . 
NC = Non-compliance (NCit = 1 if farmer i does not comply at time t, NCit = 0 
otherwise) 
C = Compliance cost saved when infringing upon the standard and which depends 
on 
 s = site (location of the farm) 
 fs = farm size (e.g., measured in UAA of the farm) 
 ft = farm type (e.g., dairy farm or arable farm) 
 fe = farmer’s experience (e.g., measured in years of organic farming  
     practice) 
 fl = farmer’s liquidity 
Pd = (Subjective) probability of being detected in the case of non-compliance  
    depending  
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 on s, fs, ft as well as on 
 IF = (perceived) inspection frequency and 
 IR = (perceived) inspection rigor (e.g., determined by inspection duration and 
accuracy observed during former inspection visits) 
Ps = Probability of being sanctioned when detected, which depends on 
 SF = (perceived) sanction frequency in the case of detected non-compliance  
F = Fine related to the sanction (assumed to be given and constant over time) 
L = Present value of future profits lost due to sanction-related marketing restrictions, 
which depend on s, fs and ft as well as on 
 d  = discount rate (also influenced by the farmer’s liquidity fl) 
ɛit = error term reflecting further individually different costs and/or benefit-
determining factors, such as the “warm glow” discussed herein, as well as a 
random error. 
 
We must address an incentive constraint, which, in our case, is fulfilled when inequality 
(5.1) is negative, thus motivating farmers already in the organic farming business to 
comply with the agreed standard. We assume that the participation constraint is fulfilled 
in either case, which means that organic farmers’ utility derived from correctly farming 
organically is always greater than the respective reservation utility, which for instance, 
could be the expected profit from conventional farming (for a general explanation of 
incentive and participation constraints in principal agency theory, see FURUBOTN and 
RICHTER, 2005, p. 206ff.). 
Inequality (5.1) is intended for a situation in which farmers have an interest to stay in the 
organic business, as they expect future profits from farming organically and selling their 
produce as organic. Otherwise, L in the above inequality would be zero. In other words, L 
is the present value of a so-called reputation rent that can be lost if cheating is detected. 
In this sense, our approach differs from standard economics of crime, as we are 
incorporating elements of the theory of self-enforcing agreements according to which a 
„firm will honor its implicit quality contract as long as the difference between the capital 
values of the noncheating and cheating strategies […] is positive“ (KLEIN and 
LEFFLER, 1981, p. 622) in our model (for a similar application in the context of food 
safety standard enforcement, cf. LIPPERT, 2002). A possible direct sanction (fine F) is 
increased by an indirect sanction because of additional market sanction-related losses L. 
Consequently, the following model does not apply to anonymous fraudulent actors who 
just sell their conventional produce as organic and then disappear from the market (i.e., a 
“hit and run” strategy). In practice, the amount of L is a farm individual expectation value 
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depending, among other things, on the quantity of future produce excluded from organic 
marketing due to a certain standard non-compliance as well as on the corresponding time 
span during which organic marketing will be prohibited. In the case in which a batch of 
cheese has been incorrectly labeled this time span will only cover a few days, whereas it 
may extend to “eternity” in a case of deliberate severe non-compliance such as the large-
scale use of forbidden pesticides. 
In organic agriculture, some rules’ compliance costs, Ci, are likely to strongly vary over 
the years depending on weather conditions. For instance, a humid spring that leads to 
increased pressure from fungal plant diseases could strongly increase opportunity cost, Ci, 
which consists of profit reductions when renouncing forbidden fungicides. 
Notice that compliance costs, Ci, do not only contain opportunity and/or production costs 
directly resulting from observing the specific organic standard, but they also contain 
information and transaction costs that must be borne because compliance implies being 
well informed about the corresponding process standard. The individual information costs 
depend, among other things, on the education and the cognitive faculty of every farmer i. 
In this sense, careless, non-compliant farmers (who apparently do not consciously cheat) 
can also be considered to be implicitly acting according to inequality (5.1). Because they 
were inaccurate, they unconsciously evaluated costs, Ci, which incorporate the cost for 
obtaining all information necessary for accuracy, as greater than the expected losses due 
to possible sanctions. 
Furthermore, again depending on the personality of the respective farmer, costs, Ci, may 
be more or less reduced due to the good feeling – the “warm glow” – linked to 
compliance with the organic standard. For some farmers, the monetary equivalent of this 
“warm glow” may be so high that they will never cheat regardless of how high the 
compliance costs. These farmers are clearly non-opportunistic. Consequently, a given 
group of farmers may consist of two subgroups: non-opportunistic farmers for whom NCit 
is always zero and opportunistic farmers who will continuously ponder their behavior 
according to inequality (5.1). 
Then, let x be any factor that determines the magnitude of the net benefit, Bt, of a given 
type of non-compliance that when detected and punished, entails direct and/or indirect 
sanctions. Thus, it follows that as long as  
CHAPTER 5  Heuristic model 
86 
(5.2) 
a relevant increase of the benefit determining factor x will lead 
(i) to a higher probability P(NCit = 1) that a certain farmer i does not comply with the 
corresponding standard and 
(ii)  to a higher overall number of non-complying farmers (NCF) as inequality (5.1) 
will become positive for more opportunistic farmers. 
Because  
(5.2a) 
the number of non-complying farmers, NCF, should decrease with the probability of 
being detected in the case of non-compliance. The same holds for the effect of the 
inspection frequency, as 
(5.2b) 
According to inequality (5.1), an increased monetary value of sanctions will entail a 
decline in the number of non-complying farmers, NCF, because 
(5.2c) 
 
5.3 Model for the optimization of inspection strategies to reduce 
organic farmers’ non-compliance 
According to the microeconomic theory as treated in this chapter in section 5.3.1, we will 
briefly outline a general model structure that illustrates the interactions and implications 
of important factors that impact the minimization of the social cost related to non-
compliance. Here, the main objective is to illustrate the structure of the problem. To 
derive quantitative recommendations from such a model for specific standard and 
inspection situations would require the quantification of its parameters and functional 
relationships. In section 5.3.2, we develop a simplified heuristic model that – using rough 
assumptions for parameters and social damage functions – allows for analyzing the 
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interplay of important factors that need to be considered when designing inspection 
strategies. 
5.3.1 General model structure 
Our normative analysis of organic farming control measures is based on the idea that a 
control body should implement a combination of sanctions and inspection frequencies in 
such a way that the resulting incidence of non-compliance will be socially optimal (for a 
background, cf. BECKER, 1974; BECKER, 1976; PYLE, 1983; for an application to 
food safety performance standards, cf. LIPPERT, 2002). 
In the following, we consider a group of nk organic farmers who share the same site 
conditions, s, and farm type, ft, and whose farms are characterized by a similar farm size, 
fs, as well as similar organic farming experience fe. However, the members of this group 
are different with respect to some other individual attributes that are difficult to observe 
such as the availability of liquid assets and present values of future profits lost due to 
possible sanctions, L. The corresponding characteristics determine the differences in 
compliance behavior within the group. NCFk t ≤ nk is the number of non-complying 
farmers at time t within the group. 
Notice that the inspections considered in our model are spot checks that verify whether a 
certain well-specified standard has been observed. These checks occur during a given 
period of time t. Their frequency lies between 0 (i.e., no inspection visit at all) and 1 (i.e., 
all farms nk are inspected within period t). A further simplification consists of the isolated 
consideration of different organic farming rules, which means that we do not consider all 
of the rules to be met when farming organically but only single rules such as the 
interdiction of chemical fertilizers, the banning of certain pesticides or the 
implementation of specific bookkeeping duties. Such a separated consideration of the 
rules is necessary because of the varied magnitude of the related damages. Damages 
resulting from an infringement of bookkeeping duties are rather small, whereas ecological 
and (sectoral) social damages linked to the use of a forbidden pesticide can be enormous.  
With respect to the social damage generated by the breach of a specific organic standard 
or rule, we distinguish three different categories: 
DE(NCFk t) = Ecological damage resulting from foregone positive externalities linked 
to compliance with the considered standard,  
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DC(NCFk t) = Consumer damage to be borne by the purchasers of organic products 
who (ignorantly) do not receive the product for which they actually paid 
and 
DS(NCFk t) = Sectoral damage resulting from diminished total revenues of the entire 
organic sector because of loss of consumer trust when a standard breach 
emerges. 
Relevance, size and marginal damage strongly differ for the different categories 
depending on the organic product and the standard or rule considered. For the first 
category, it seems plausible to assume a cubic damage function as the one displayed in 
Figure 5.1a, which means marginal Ecological damage (DE) – for example, due to 
pesticide emissions – increases with the number of non-complying farms until a certain 
point and then declines until a maximum damage is reached. With only several non-
complying farms, the marginal ecological damage is relatively low because of natural 
buffer capacities. With many non-compliers, the environment may be already so strongly 
degraded that a further non-complying farm would not add much additional harm. 
  
(a)       (b)     (c) 
DE = Ecological damage, DC = Consumer damage, DS = Sectoral damage, NCFk = number of non-
complying farmers, nk = number of all organic farmers in the group, m = number of always complying 
organic farmers and D.max = maximum possible damage in the respective category  – Further explanations 
in the text. 
 
Fig. 5.1 Examples for possible social damage functions 
 
Consumer damage (DC) occurs either when a purchaser unwittingly consumes faulty 
food items, that is, products that do not have the characteristics paid for that are from 
undetected non-complying farms or when, as a consequence of detected non-compliance, 
such items are marketed at the lower price for conventional produce. In the latter case, the 
corresponding marginal damage could be estimated based on the price difference between 
CHAPTER 5  Heuristic model 
89 
the organic and the conventional product. In the former case, the related marginal damage 
is difficult to assess as it may be different for each consumer. For instance, some 
consumers may valuate the harm from food that contains certain pesticide residues 
relatively high while others may see harm to be much less problematical. As it cannot be 
established whether a defective product will be consumed by somebody who valuates this 
fact more or less seriously, a constant marginal damage is assumed, leading to a linear 
damage function, as the one shown in Figure 5.1b. In some cases, the corresponding 
marginal damage could be derived from the price differences between faultless (organic) 
and faulty (conventional) products. Due to the fact that some individuals have a 
willingness to pay that exceed organic market prices, such an estimate would be a lower 
bound of the true social damage ∂DC(NCFk)/∂NCFk. 
An important sectoral damage (DS) can occur when non-compliances with a rule, such as 
the ban of certain pesticides, are not detected on the farm in time period t but are revealed 
later in time period t+1 due to the supervision activities of traders or, in extreme cases, 
because of people becoming ill. In such cases, just one non-complying farm not duly 
excluded from organic business could result in a complete loss of consumer trust in the 
organic farming business. As consumer trust is an important prerequisite for obtaining 
premium prices in the organic sector (cf. GIANNAKAS, 2002; JANSSEN and HAMM, 2011), 
the resulting expected social damage would consist of the sector’s diminished total 
revenues along with future income possibilities lost due to the respective “scandal”. 
“Expected” in this context means that the assumed sectoral damage must be multiplied by 
the (subjective) probability that the non-compliance related scandal actually occurs. For 
important organic rules, such as pesticide bans, the sectoral damage function is likely to 
resemble the one displayed in Figure 5.1c: only a few, or even one, non-complying 
farmer may cause maximum possible sectoral damage. 
Considering both the social damages linked to non-compliance D.(NCFk t) and the control 
body’s costly inspection and sanction effort Et (expressed in monetary units), the 
objective is to optimize the NCFk t. Therefore, from the perspective of a governmental 
authority or a control body acting on behalf of the entire society and assuming that the 
fine F is imposed if there is detected non-compliance, the following net social cost G has 
to be minimized (symbols used as introduced above and defined in the annex):  
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(5.3) 
with 
(5.4) 
where DSt+1(.) is the discounted future sectoral damage resulting from non-complying 
farms not detected in time period t. 
Merging DE and DC as DEC and assuming an interior solution for a steady-state situation 
(where, for all relevant variables, the optimized values v = vt+1 = vt = vt-1), the following 
first order conditions must be fulfilled: 
(5.5a) 
 
 
(5.5b) 
 
 
(5.5c) 
 
 
Condition (5.5a) implies that in the optimum, the marginal cost of increasing the 
inspection frequency ∂E(.)/∂IF minus the increase in captured fines related to the 
marginal change ∂IF should be equal to the resulting reduced social damage plus the 
avoided future damage due to additional detection of non-compliance. Condition (5.5b) 
can be interpreted similarly with regard to the marginal cost of increasing the inspection 
rigor ∂E(.)/∂IR. Condition (5.5c) indicates that the marginal cost of increasing the 
sanction frequency in case of detected non-compliance ∂E(.)/∂SF minus the resulting 
increase in captured fines should be equal to the reduced social damage caused by the 
deterring effect of the marginal change ∂SF. 
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The right-hand side of condition (5.5a) illustrates that an increase in the inspection 
frequency may have two damage reducing effects: an indirect effect resulting from 
deterrence (less DEC and DS because of fewer non-complying organic farmers as more 
farmers will comply with the standard due to higher expected sanctions) and a direct 
effect because, in the future, less faulty organic production will be brought to the market 
as more non-complying farms are found today (i.e., reduced DS). 
Furthermore, following the idea already put forward by JEREMY BENTHAM in 1823 (1907, 
p.171, p.175) that an offender’s harm due to punishment should not exceed the damage to 
be avoided, from an overall social point of view, constraint 
(5.5d) 
should be observed. Thus, the expected non-complying farmer’s loss due to the sanction 
(corresponding to compliance cost CMNC of the marginal offender i = nMNC ≤ nk, according 
to (5.1) should be less or equal to the related expected marginal damage caused to other 
members of the society. 
5.3.2 Simplified heuristic model 
To simplify the problem, it is assumed that in the analyzed steady state, Pd(IF) = IF such 
that ∂Pd/∂IF = 1. The further simplification of assumptions affects both inspection rigor 
IR and sanction frequency in the case of detected non-compliance (in the following, Ps = 
SF = 1), which are supposed to be given and cannot be influenced. Consequently, 
conditions (5.5b) and (5.5c) are not relevant in the following. 
Next, for simplicity, we neglect consumer damage DC and imagine a situation in which 
the non-compliance does affect the environment but does not affect the material food 
qualities (e.g., forbidden pesticide use, which reduces biodiversity but does not lead to 
residues in food). Hence, we can set the constant marginal damage ∂DC/∂NCFk = 0. 
In the scenarios in which it is relevant, the sectoral damage, DS, will be modeled as 
represented in Figure 5.1c, indicating that for the first few non-complying farms there 
will be a rather significant marginal damage. Thus, DSmax, which could be the difference 
in sales revenues from marketing the entire organic sectors’ produce either organically or 
conventionally, may be reached relatively soon. It only takes several non-complying 
farms being detected by traders, journalists or other actors to lose consumer trust and 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )( ), 1 ,
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completely ruin the organic market. The social damage, DE, will continuously increase 
with the number of non-complying farmers. It should be zero at NCFk = 0, and it will 
reach its maximum at DE(nk) = DEmax. For the reasons previously cited, we assume a 
cubic damage function (i.e., initially increasing, later decreasing marginal damage, see 
Figure 5.1a). When DE(0) = 0, DE(nk) = DEmax and ∂DE(0)/∂NCFk = ∂DE(nk)/∂NCFk = 
0, this function can be written as 
(5.6) 
In practice, if available, a rough estimate of the damage, DEmax, could be the difference 
between society’s willingness to pay for the higher biodiversity linked to nk farms 
farming organically. 
A simple way to model a control body’s inspection cost for a given inspection rigor, IR, 
as well as a given sanction frequency, SF, is to assume 
(5.7) 
with cv = cost per inspection visit. 
When making assumptions for the necessary parameters, it should always be assumed 
that the average compliance costs, μC, do not exceed the average social damage per non-
complying farm (DECmax/nk), as otherwise – according to the reasoning leading to 
inequality (5.5d) – the corresponding standard would not be reasonable from a social 
point of view. When building a sensible heuristic model, also the magnitudes of the 
possible future farm losses, L, in the case of detected non-compliance as well as 
inspection costs, cv, and the fine, F, should be reasonably related to the average damage, 
DECmax/nk. 
Next, the relationship between the equilibrium probability of being detected when not 
complying with the standard and the number of offenders NCFk(Pd) must be modeled. 
This modeling is achieved using Monte Carlo experiments. For this purpose, m members 
of the group of nk farmers are assumed to be always honest and perfectly informed. 
Consequently, they will always comply with the considered organic standard no matter 
how disadvantageous this may seem for them, whereas the remaining nk – m farmers 
within the group will act opportunistically. According to inequality (5.1), an opportunistic 
farmer’s compliance costs, Ci, and her expected overall losses, Pd ∙ (F+Li), when being 
( ) 2 3max max2 33 2 .k k k
k k
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detected as non-compliant determine whether she will comply with the standard (see 
corresponding inequality (5.1b), below). 
In the following, the variables Li and Ci are assumed to be normally distributed. Note, 
again, that a relatively broad range of possible costs, Ci, may also cover the high 
compliance costs of inadvertent or careless farmers who do not cheat consciously but who 
make mistakes because they do not know how to fulfill the required rules (see chapter 
5.2). If they seriously tried to comply, it would lead to relatively high individual 
transaction costs incurred when gathering the necessary information. “Non-compliers by 
inadvertence” do not have (or want) to bear these costs. In every model run, using the 
assumed normal distributions, random values for Li and Ci are drawn. Then, every risk-
neutral opportunistic farmer i (i = 1, …, nk – m) checks for the given fine, F, at every 
probability Pd between 0 and 1 whether 
(5.1b) 
Those farmers for whom (5.1b) is negative will be non-compliers (NCi = 1). Summing up 
all non-compliers at different probabilities, Pd, yields a curve, NCFk(Pd), that is used to 
calculate the respective net social damages, G(Pd), as defined in equation (5.3). 
5.4 Model simulations to identify optimum inspection strategies 
under different scenarios 
For every scenario, five Monte Carlo simulations are performed. In each simulation run, 
nk – m combinations of Ci and Li are drawn from the two normal distributions Ф(Ci) and 
Ф(Li). Then, for 100 probabilities between 0 and 1, each farm i is assigned its compliance 
status according to inequality (5.1b). Finally, for every run, the curves NCFk(Pd) and 
G(Pd) can be displayed. The latter curve will be used to approximate the optimum 
inspection frequency for the set of assumed parameters in the respective scenario. 
To implement a heuristic model, sensible values that warrant realistic ratios between the 
different parameters introduced must be assumed. For the simulations of the reference 
scenario, we set a total of nk = 500 farms of which m = 200 are always complying with 
the considered standard. The maximum possible damage, DEmax, is 500,000 €. 
Furthermore, in the reference scenario, we set F = 0 € (i.e., no fine in the case of detected 
( ) 0 .d i iP F L C⋅ + − <
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non-compliance), cv = 200 € and the average compliance cost, μC = 800 €; the average 
loss L is μL = 1,600 €. Initially, the standard deviations are set to σL = 160 € and σC = 250 
€. A cubic damage function corresponding to equation (5.6) and Figure 5.1a is used. 
In the reference scenario, the possible future sectoral damage is neglected (i.e., DS(.) = 
0). The resulting curves NCFk(Pd) and G(Pd) for the five runs of the reference scenario 
are shown in Figures 5.2a and 5.2b.  
  
Model parameters for the reference scenario: 
Pd(IF) = IF; SF = 1; nk = 500; m = 200; DEmax = 500,000 €; cv = 200 €; μL = 1,600 €; σL = 160 €; 
DSmax = 0 €; ∂DS/∂NCFk = 0 €; μC = 800 €; σC = 250 €; F = 0 €. 
 
Fig. 5.2a Number of non-complying farms  
                   NCFk depending on detection  
                   probability Pd 
Fig. 5.2b Net social cost G (equ. (5.3))  
                     depending on detection  
                     probability Pd 
 
Depending on the run, the optimum inspection frequency corresponds to approximately 
74%, and the corresponding minimized net social cost is between 75,000 and 80,000 €. In 
the optimum, between 18 and 30 non-complying farms would be accepted by the control 
body. However, if, in addition, restriction (5.5d) was to be observed, the inspection 
frequency could be lowered to approximately 56% until the damage, ∂DE/∂NCFk, of the 
marginal non-complying farm (except for run 2 NCFk ≈ 100 in this case) exceeds Pd μL = 
0.56 ∙ 1,600 = 896 € (which is a rough estimate of the marginal offender’s expected loss). 
In doing so, inspection costs could be saved while the resulting additional damage, DE, 
which leads to an increase of G(Pd), would be overcompensated by the saved compliance 
costs of the additional non-complying farmers. 
Next, in scenario I, a fine of F = 2,400 € in the case of detected non-compliance is 
introduced. All other parameters are kept constant, and again the corresponding Monte 
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Carlo simulation is performed five times, which leads to the results displayed in Figures 
5.3a and 5.3b.  
  
Model parameters for scenario I: 
Pd(IF) = IF; SF = 1; nk = 500; m = 200; DEmax = 500,000 €; cv = 200 €; μL = 1,600 €; σL = 160 €; 
DSmax = 0 €; ∂DS/∂NCFk = 0 €; μC = 800 €; σC = 250 €; F = 2,400 €. 
 
Fig. 5.3a Number of non-complying farms  
                   NCFk depending on detection  
                   probability Pd 
Fig. 5.3b Net social cost G (equ. (5.3))  
                     depending on detection  
                     probability Pd 
 
In scenario I, the optimum inspection frequency is approximately 25%, and the 
corresponding minimized net social cost is approximately 9,000 €. In the new optimum, 
there would exist more (≈ 60 except for run 2) non-complying farms. Nevertheless, the 
net social cost is much lower than in the reference scenario because the expected fines 
and the inspection costs saved over-compensate the damage caused by the additional non-
complying farmers. However, in this context, it should be considered that fines are not 
social benefits but merely a transferred welfare. Again, observing restriction (5.5d), the 
inspection frequency could be further reduced, but only slightly, to approximately 22% or 
23%. 
While maintaining all other parameters from scenario I in the following two scenarios, we 
vary the standard deviation of compliance cost σC. Figures 5.4 (scenario II, high σC) and 
5.5 (scenario III, low σC) reflect the resulting effects on the number of non-complying 
farms and on net social costs. Obviously, when opportunistic farmers are rather 
homogeneous regarding their compliance costs (i.e., low σC) an optimum detection 
probability is easier to find. In addition, close to this optimum detection probability, an 
increase in inspection frequency is more effective in this case. 
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Model parameters for scenario II: 
Pd(IF) = IF; SF = 1; nk = 500; m = 200; DEmax = 500,000 €; cv = 200 €; μL = 1,600 €; σL = 160 €; 
DSmax = 0 €; ∂DS/∂NCFk = 0 €; μC = 800 €; σC = 500 €; F = 2,400 €.  
 
Fig. 5.4a Number of non-complying farms  
                   NCFk depending on detection  
                   probability Pd 
Fig. 5.4b Net social cost G (equ. (5.3))  
                     depending on detection  
                     probability Pd 
 
  
Model parameters for scenario III: 
Pd(IF) = IF; SF = 1; nk = 500; m = 200; DEmax = 500,000 €; cv = 200 €; μL = 1,600 €; σL = 160 €; 
DSmax = 0 €; ∂DS/∂NCFk = 0 €; μC = 800 €; σC = 50 €; F = 2,400 €.  
 
Fig. 5.5a Number of non-complying farms  
                   NCFk depending on detection  
                   probability Pd 
Fig. 5.5b Net social cost G (equ. (5.3))  
                     depending on detection  
                     probability Pd 
 
Especially with respect to organic crop farming, compliance costs for the fulfillment of 
certain rules may strongly vary between years. For instance, due to humid weather 
conditions during the growing season, the opportunity costs for renouncing certain 
banned pesticides could easily increase. In scenario IV (see Figures 5.6), we maintain all 
parameters assumed in scenario I except the average compliance cost, μC, for which we 
simulated an increase of 50%. As a consequence, in the model, the certification body’s 
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optimum inspection frequency increases from approximately 25% to roughly 34%. At the 
same time, minimized net social costs, as defined by equation (5.3), are reduced by more 
than 5,000 € because the increased ecological damages and inspection costs are 
overcompensated by expected revenues from fines. Despite the higher control frequency 
leading to an increase in farmers’ expected fines and future income losses, the number of 
non-complying farmers increases from approximately 60 to 77.  
  
Model parameters for scenario IV: 
Pd(IF) = IF; SF = 1; nk = 500; m = 200; DEmax = 500,000 €; cv = 200 €; μL = 1,600 €; σL = 160 €; 
DSmax = 0 €; ∂DS/∂NCFk = 0 €; μC = 1,200 €; σC = 250 €; F = 2,400 €. 
 
Fig. 5.6a Number of non-complying farms  
                   NCFk depending on detection  
                   probability Pd 
Fig. 5.6b Net social cost G (equ. (5.3))  
                      depending on detection  
                      probability Pd 
 
Finally, in scenario V (see Figures 5.7), we analyzed the effects of an important possible 
sectoral damage, DS, on optimized inspection frequencies and overall social costs. We 
assumed that for a fundamental organic rule, a hidden non-compliance of 10% (i.e., 50 
non-complying model farms that are not detected during spot check controls) will 
eventually lead to a scandal that completely ruins the regional organic market for one 
year. Estimating a related damage, DSmax, of 7,500,000 €3 and using a damage function 
such as the one displayed in Figure 5.1c, we obtain a marginal damage, ∂DS/∂NCFk, of 
150,000 € per initially undetected non-complying farm when (1 – Pd) NCFk < 50 and a 
marginal damage of zero otherwise. All other parameters are the same as in scenario I.  
                                                 
3  The maximum potential sectoral damage DSmax should be related to the number and size of organic 
farms involved. In principle, it can be estimated from the organic sector’s loss that would occur when its 
entire produce was sold at conventional prices instead of the higher organic market prices (i.e., the 
difference in corresponding sales revenues). Here, we assumed the entire sector consists of our nk farms. 
A supposed per farm sales revenue difference of 15,000 € leads to a maximum sectoral damage of 
15,000 times 500 = 7,500,000 € if the sector’s entire organic produce has to be marketed conventionally. 
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Model parameters for scenario V: 
Pd(IF) = IF; SF = 1; nk = 500; m = 200; DEmax = 500,000 €; cv = 200 €; μL = 1,600 €; σL = 160 €; 
DSmax = 7,500,000 €; ∂DS/∂NCFk = 150,000 €; μC = 800 €; σC = 250 €; F = 2,400 €. 
 
Fig. 5.7a Number of non-complying farms  
                   NCFk depending on detection  
                   probability Pd 
Fig. 5.7b Net social cost G (equ. (5.3))  
                      depending on detection  
                      probability Pd 
 
In scenario V, the optimum inspection strategy consists of extending the spot check 
controls until all farms comply with the respective standard. Depending on the run, this 
occurs in the model for inspection frequencies between 37% and 42% (instead of 
approximately 25% in the optimum of scenario I). Consequently, no ecological damage, 
DE, or sectoral damage, DS, occurs. Costs of inspection visits, not diminished by 
revenues from fines, are the only remaining social costs. Note that, given the farmers’ 
good reactivity for the set of model assumptions analyzed in this scenario, it is not 
necessary to inspect all farms in order to make all farmers comply with the standard. 
With a slight adaptation, the heuristic model developed thus far can be implemented by 
control bodies or authorities to analyze the implications of and to, at least approximately, 
optimize inspection strategies for groups of farmers in which the farmers within each 
group have a similar detection probability function Pd(., IF).  
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In the next subsection we discuss possible model extensions. Then, we raise some caveats 
before concluding with suggestions to improve inspection strategies. 
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5.5.1 Possible model extensions 
By broadening the horizon and looking beyond the inspection system, a further extension 
of the model could be the introduction of an additional probability, Pin, of being detected 
in the event of non-compliance independent of inspection frequency IF (e.g., due to 
whistle-blowers or because of hints from other parts of the supply chain). Then, the 
probability of being detected in the event of non-compliance would be 
(5.8) 
For simplicity, we assume that F = ∂DS/∂NCFk = 0 and IR and SF are given and constant 
over time. Then, entering Pd(IF) from equation (5.8) into equations (5.3) and (5.4) and 
assuming, again, the existence of an interior solution for a steady state of minimized net 
social costs, the first order condition (5.5a) can be rewritten as 
(5.5a*)  
Thus, in the case of decreasing marginal damage due to non-compliance and increasing 
marginal costs of inspection frequency, a rise in Pin reduces the optimum inspection 
frequency. Pin will be higher when the traceability of organic products is well established 
and warranted. However, the implementation or improvement of a corresponding system 
along the entire supply chain also entails costs in a way that a trade-off between further 
increasing the inspection frequency IF or the probability Pin must be faced. Consequently, 
under the assumptions above, a further optimum condition in addition to condition (5.5a*) 
must be considered 
(5.5a**) 
Furthermore, risk-averse behavior could be modeled by adding a risk premium ri(Pd; 
F+Li) to the left-hand side of inequality (5.1b). However, this addition would complicate 
the analysis as it implies assigning individual utility functions to the different farmers. 
5.5.2 Caveats 
As illustrated in chapter 5.4, the implementation or increase of fines can facilitate 
standard enforcement and reduce corresponding social costs. However, in practice, 
further transaction costs for related law suits and administration must be considered when 
trying to improve the efficiency of the certification system. Moreover, with respect to 
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elevated fines, the fines may have an undesired effect on the participation constraint 
mentioned in chapter 5.2. Such an effect was not included in our heuristic model. That is, 
assuming a certain probability of being sentenced innocently, conventional farmers may 
refrain from converting to organic farming because the corresponding expected utility 
(reduced by expected unjustified fines) does not cover their reservation utility. 
Our heuristic model incorporates the concept of self-enforcing agreements (see chapter 
5.2), which implies that higher (expected future) prices for organic produce will increase 
the number of complying farms because of rising possible losses, Li. Hence, in our model, 
greater price premiums for organic products are expected to reduce fraudulent behavior. 
However, in this context, it should be noticed that this conclusion is based on the specific 
market situation of organic farmers within a given region. There are many well-known 
farmers who cannot act anonymously. In another market situation, for example, when 
unknown traders attempt to sell their produce only once, high price premiums may have 
the opposite effect and attract more cheaters to the market. 
Our model considerations are based on the concepts of opportunistic behavior and 
bounded rationality (for these concepts see FURUBOTN and RICHTER, 2005, p. 4f.), which 
means that people are supposed to act rationally given their limited information 
processing capacities. We did not include in our model clearly irrational or “crazy” 
behavior. In practice, this omission means that despite high expected sanction values 
along with low compliance costs, some non-compliance may still occur. Similarly, a 
sequence of unfortunate events may have such an effect. Thus, in the case of large 
possible damages, DS, it may be advisable to conduct further spot checks even if, in 
principle, every reasonable opportunistic farmer is supposed to comply for her own sake 
(for the situation outlined in Figures 5.7, this could mean to further extend inspections 
beyond a frequency of 42%). 
Moreover, the socio-legal literature on compliance with regulations suggests that 
compliance behavior is not just determined by the fear of sanctions and rational self-
interest (cf. AMODU, 2008). Among other factors, the general context and the design of 
regulations are important as are the inspectors’ enforcement activities that go beyond 
imposed sanctions (AMODU, 2008). According to psychological literature, people are 
inclined to comply when the respective rules are perceived as fair and appropriate (cf. the 
literature quoted in HERZFELD and JONGENEEL, 2008, p. 8). In this context, a rule that does 
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not make sense for the farmers or is seen as mere chicanery is less likely to be strictly 
observed. 
5.5.3 Suggestions to improve inspection strategies 
When planning efficient inspection strategies, possible social damages from standard 
infringements, costs of inspection measures and compliance costs dependent on the 
farmers’ abilities to change their behavior should be considered. These factors must be 
balanced when choosing or updating inspection frequencies for the supervision of 
different organic rules (e.g., in the case of low social damage due to non-compliance but 
very costly inspection measures, corresponding spot checks or tests, if conducted at all, 
should be conducted rarely). 
Due to differences in compliance costs and losses resulting from sanctions, as illustrated 
in chapter 5.2, different types of farms may demonstrate different compliance behaviors 
for the same rules and related possible damages. Thus, inspection frequencies should be 
targeted to farm types in such a way that a control body applies a higher inspection 
frequency when the respective farm category has shown a greater probability of non-
compliance in the past. Only under the assumption of a farm-type independent detection 
probability, such a strategy means directing inspections towards farmers with a truly 
higher probability of non-compliance. Even if this assumption is not fulfilled, this 
approach would be sensible provided the control body is interested in directly avoiding 
sectoral damages (see DSt+1 in equation (5.3), section 5.3.1). When looking for factors 
that increase non-compliance or detection probability, control bodies may rely on 
adequate statistical modeling such as the use of discrete choice models. 
A further reason for separating farms into relatively homogenous groups when designing 
inspection strategies is that, in such groups, the effects of different control strategies on 
farmers’ compliance behavior are easier to assess (see chapter 5.4). 
Inequality (5.1) in chapter 5.1 also illustrates that opportunistic farmers’ expectations are 
based on previous experiences, thus suggesting that these farmers will adapt their 
compliance behaviors according to perceived past inspection and sanction frequencies. 
Consequently, a control body should adapt its inspection strategy, which could be done 
based on continuously up-dated discrete choice models that explain actual non-
compliance probabilities. Furthermore, control bodies can occasionally vary the 
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frequencies of unannounced inspections IFt (some farmers are controlled more frequently 
and others less frequently) to gain a better understanding of how corresponding farms 
react (i.e., to approximate the effect ∂NCFk/∂IFt-1). 
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5.7 Annex: List of symbols used  
H[.] = expectation of . 
t = time period (year) 
i = farm number (i = 1, …, n) 
B│. = net benefit given . 
NC = non-compliance (1 if farmer i does not comply, 0 otherwise) 
C = compliance cost saved when infringing upon the standard 
s = site (location of the farm) 
fs = farm size 
ft = farm type 
fe = farmer’s experience 
fl = farmer’s liquidity 
Pd = (subjective) probability of being detected in the case of non-compliance 
IF = (perceived) inspection frequency 
IR = (perceived) inspection rigor 
Ps = probability of being sanctioned when detected 
SF = (perceived) sanction frequency in the case of detected non-compliance  
F = fine related to the sanction 
L = present value of future profits lost due to sanction-related marketing restrictions 
d  = discount rate 
ɛit = error term reflecting further individually different costs and/or benefit-determining 
factors 
x = any factor that determines the magnitude of the benefit of a given type of non- 
    compliance 
P(NCit =1) = probability that a certain farmer i does not comply 
NCF = number of non-complying farmers 
nk  = number of organic farmers who share the same farm characteristics but are different 
    regarding some individual attributes 
NCFk  = number of non-complying farmers among the nk farmers 
m = number of always complying farmers among the nk farmers 
DE(.) = ecological damage resulting from lost positive externalities linked to compliance  
DC(.) = consumer damage to be borne by the purchasers of organic products  
DS(.) = sectoral damage resulting from diminished total revenues of the entire organic sector 
DEC = DE(.) + DC(.) 
D.max = maximum possible damage in the respective damage category 
G = defined net social cost resulting from non-compliance 
v = optimized value for a certain variable 
E = the control body’s costly inspection and sanction effort expressed in monetary units 
cv = cost per inspection visit 
nMNC = index number of the marginal non-complying farmer (1 ≤ nMNC ≤ nk) 
LMNC = present value of future sanction-related losses of the marginal non-complying farmer 
CMNC = compliance cost of the marginal non-complying farmer 
Ф(Ci) = probability density function of the N(μC, σC2) normally distributed compliance cost Ci  
μC = average compliance cost at farm level 
σC = standard deviation of compliance cost at farm level 
Ф(Li) = probability density function of the N(μL, σL2) normally distributed losses Li 
μL = average present value of future sanction-related losses at the farm level 
σL = standard deviation of present value of future sanction-related losses at the farm level 
Pin = probability of being detected independently from or outside of inspections in the case 
   of non-compliance 
ri = risk premium assumed by farmer i 
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6 Synthesis and outlook  
This final chapter intends to link the results that are presented in the preceding chapters in 
the format of journal articles. In the first section (6.1), emphasis is put on the specific 
characteristics of organic control data and the relevance of these peculiarities when 
analysing such data. This is also of relevance for supervision, to which the chapter 6.2 is 
devoted. The subsequent section presents the experiences gained when analysing non-
compliance. These experiences then are considered in the heuristic model (6.4) that opens 
up the view and addresses control strategies from a system-view. The chapter concludes 
with an outlook on research suitable to extend the current work.  
6.1 Characteristics of organic control data 
Central parts of this thesis are based on the analysis of data originating from the organic 
control process, namely the chapters 2, 3 and 4. The quantitative analyses presented 
above, assume that potential biases are randomly distributed. The particular process of 
collecting organic control data can feature different biases, however. The following 
section illustrates and discusses different potential biases that could influence organic 
control data.  
First, control data certainly are biased by an unknown dark figure. The dark figure 
consists of undetected non-compliant operators. Usual methods to asses dark figures in 
the area of business crime are not applicable (Bundesministerium des Inneren and 
Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2006). An important proxy for the dark figure are fraud 
cases detected outside the core organic control system, e.g., by general food and feed 
control, tax audits or by sample analysis in the organic food chain. Corresponding data 
that could illuminate the size of the dark figure exist at control bodies and supervisory 
institutions but were not available for this thesis.  
Second, the data collection process is specific: every operator is controlled once, some 
operators however are controlled additionally due to the requirements of the regulation on 
the control frequency and the risk based control approach. This process corresponds to a 
complete survey of the universe which is complemented by an additional sample. If 
additional controls of an operator result in an overall higher detection probability of non-
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compliance, the results presented above could be biased by systematically different 
control frequencies.  
Third, operators that are assessed as being more risky are probably not only more 
frequently, but are potentially also more thoroughly controlled. This would constitute a 
potential positive confirmation bias whose general relevance is documented (Jones and 
Sugden, 2001; Betsch, 2005). If such a positive confirmation bias is relevant for organic 
controls, this could experimentally be tested. Eliminating such a deep-rooted 
psychological mechanism from controls is difficult. However, such an effect could 
correlate with the individual characteristics of inspectors, which could be tested by 
detailed control data.  
Fourth, it is reasonable to assume that different non-compliances exhibit different 
detectability. The data could be biased by higher detection probabilities and accordingly 
different dark figures that could correlate with specific production activities. Further 
analysis of non-compliances differentiating the area of non-compliance by detection 
frequency and sanction severity could examine this potential bias. Such analysis should 
integrate experts from the control sector. The detectability of non-compliance could also 
depend on the degree to which individual rules can be easily understood by operators and 
their acceptance of specific rules (Amodu, 2008). However, the latter effects are probably 
more relevant for minor non-compliances and not for the severe ones affecting organic 
integrity.  
Fifth, organic operators can apply for exceptional permissions regarding specific rules of 
the regulation (e.g., tie-stalls usually are temporarily permitted under specific 
circumstances). The existence of exceptional permissions theoretically reduces the 
potential not to comply by excluding a specific rule. Data on exceptional permissions 
were not available for the studies presented but should be considered in future analyses of 
more detailed data.  
Organic control data involve these biases which can only partially be considered in 
econometric modelling (e.g., the control frequency). The magnitude and relevance of 
these biases is thus largely unknown. This could present a fundamental criticism of the 
analyses presented. In future research, more detailed data and larger datasets (as well 
more records as longer time series) should be used and analysed in order to get a better 
understanding of the relevance and importance of the different biases.  
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6.2 Supervision of certification systems  
Supervision is necessary to assure independent controls. It depends on reliable and valid 
data on operator characteristics, control characteristics, detected non-compliances, and 
imposed sanctions. These prerequisites are not yet sufficiently met. This could result from 
the characteristics of organic control data, discussed above, affecting the validity of the 
data. Missing reliability, however, results at least partly from missing definitions of the 
data to be reported.  
The results of our analysis of German supervision data were intensively discussed with 
relevant stakeholders. We presented our study to different institutions, namely to 
representatives from the “Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung” (Federal 
Office for Agriculture and Food), who are responsible for collecting and merging the data 
on national level, representatives from the federal competent authorities and from 
different control bodies. The documented interest is an indicator for the practical 
relevance of this study.  
Recently, the European Commission published a working document on “official controls 
in the organic sector” (European Commission - DG Agri, 2011) and the German Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV) presented a regulation 
on the approval of organic control bodies (“Verordnung über die Zulassung von 
Kontrollstellen nach dem Öko-Landbaugesetz” in the following “ÖLG-Kontrollstellen-
Zulassungsverordnung”) (BMELV, 2011). Both documents aim at a more harmonized 
implementation of the organic regulation on European and German level. The 
specification of categories of non-compliance together with a list of measures to be taken 
in case of non-compliance by the German act caused criticism as being too detailed and 
too complex (Neuendorff and Spiller, 2011). However, these documents prepare the 
ground for a more harmonized implementation that facilitates the comparability of data 
resulting from different control bodies. Thus, the guidelines and the regulation could 
result in a more reliable supervision of the organic control systems.  
The gap of missing definitions of the central terms “irregularity” and “infringement” in 
the European organic regulation still exists today. This impedes the comparison of data on 
European level. The working document on organic controls does not alleviate this state, 
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as this document is just a guideline, i.e. it is not legally binding1. The European organic 
regulation should be amended by clearly distinguishing different non-compliances 
(including also marginal non-compliances) and subsequent sanctions.  
6.3 Analysis of non-compliance  
The econometric analysis of non-compliance with an organic standard presented in this 
thesis is an approach that has not been used previously. Such methods could complement 
and enhance risk based control approaches not only in the area of organic certification, 
but also in other control systems.  
The analyses of non-compliance consider Germany and Switzerland – two countries with 
different agricultural production conditions and different control systems (e.g., the 
German analysis refers to a public, the Swiss analysis to a private standard; see also 
Chapter 1.4.2 on the differences of the implemented sanction systems). Furthermore, the 
articles are based on different models. Therefore, the following synthesis of the results 
abstains from a comparative confrontation.  
The econometric analyses are based on theoretical considerations and the formulation of 
hypotheses which are inferred from the “Economics of Crime” approach. Both analyses 
confirm some of the hypotheses. However, the results presented in this thesis do not yield 
a satisfactory overall picture of the factors contributing to non-compliance. This is 
reflected in the low Pseudo-R² values.  
Nonetheless, the relevance of the main risk factors mentioned by the guidelines of the 
European Commission (European Commission - DG Agri, 2011) and the German 
handbook for organic control bodies (Fischer and Neuendorff, 2011) for the risk 
assessment are confirmed: previous sanctions, farm complexity (in terms of additional 
non-farm activities and livestock production complexity), and farm size. Other criteria 
suggested by either of the guidelines are also supported, however, not by both analyses 
likewise.  
                                                 
1  The working document explicates: “This document can not [sic!] be considered as a binding legal 
interpretation of the EU legislation, as such interpretation is the exclusive competence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union” (European Commission - DG Agri, 2011, p.4). 
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The impact of farm production characteristics (especially regarding crops) does not yield 
clear results: significant results appear only scattered in single years and partly are against 
the hypotheses (e.g., the effects of unutilised land). The heuristic model suggests 
grouping similar farm types due to their similar compliance costs and losses. This 
suggestion could also be considered in future econometric analyses: based on the detailed 
farm production data, the farms could be categorised into different farm types (such as 
arable crop farms, forage farms, mixed farms with/without livestock, cf. e.g., Zander et al. 
(2008)).  
The supplied control data allowed only the thorough analysis of farm data. The control 
bodies, that provided the data, collected very detailed data on farms, but only little data on 
processors and other activities. However, even the farm data do not completely cover the 
criteria suggested by the Commission guidelines (European Commission - DG Agri, 
2011) and the German handbook (Fischer and Neuendorff, 2011) on risk based control 
approaches. It could be possible that the observed disparity of data coverage between 
farm operators and non-farm operators is not representative. However, the private control 
bodies that provided the organic control data are of high market importance, nationally 
and internationally. Therefore, the observed disparity seems relevant. This shortcoming is 
also relevant for supervision issues, since the structure of the controlled operators and 
associated determinants for non-compliance with regard to processing and other 
production activities could not be further examined (see Chapter 2.4). 
The results of the farm analysis point to the importance of operations’ structural data. 
Therefore it could also be useful to collect such data on non-farm operators more 
systematically (for lists of data that could be collected, cf. European Commission - DG 
Agri, 2011; Fischer and Neuendorff, 2011).  
The overall explanatory content of the models indicates the potential to improve the 
models by integrating further variables. This especially refers to personal characteristics 
of an operator, such as age, education, qualification, risk and environmental attitude, and 
criminal record. Also financial data of the farmer and the farm could be of specific 
relevance. The importance of the latter data is acknowledged by the German handbook. 
However, it is very difficult to get relevant and valid data in this area. Scientific research 
interest regarding most of the data mentioned probably conflicts with data protection 
issues and also the acceptance of organic operators.  
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The “gut feeling” of inspectors performing controls can be an important factor for 
detecting non-compliance. Although this thesis argues strongly for a further development 
of quantitative risk assessment, at the same time, it concedes the invaluable instinct of the 
inspector, who visits organic operations, talks to the responsible managers, and who 
observes the production process. Capturing this “gut feeling” by reliable indicators, could 
be a fruitful approach.  
The inclusion of further data on farms’ natural conditions, seasonal climate situation 
affecting production conditions or market data could also be an option to further elaborate 
quantitative risk assessment.  
6.4 Heuristic model 
The heuristic model considers the results of the preceding articles and – after the incipient 
supervision article – again adopts a societal view on the organic control system. This 
model not only illustrates the theoretical foundation of the econometric models in detail 
but especially considers the damage resulting from non-compliance and the cost of a 
control system. Hereby, the relevant parameters for optimising the control system are 
described. The Monte Carlo simulations highlight the important interrelations between 
the relevant parameters. The heuristic model can contribute to an optimisation of control 
strategies.  
The organic certification market in Germany currently comprises 20 control bodies (BLE, 
2012). Furthermore, 15 federal competent authorities supervise the implementation of the 
EU organic regulation. This plurality of actors framing and influencing control strategies 
complicates a harmonised and efficient implementation. However, the heuristic model 
implies an overall view on the control system and assumes a central control of important 
parameters.  
The idea to centrally prescribe basic control requirements (e.g., number of additional 
controls, share of unannounced controls, and number of samples to be taken) expressed in 
the “ÖLG-Kontrollstellen-Zulassungsverordnung” therefore is reasonable. The draft of 
this regulation is in the process of enactment. The requirements defined by this regulation 
probably are – if at all – only based on rough economic considerations. Therefore, the 
implementation, the effectiveness as well as the costs of the implementation of this 
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regulation must be monitored. The presented heuristic model can be a useful tool when 
evaluating and monitoring the “ÖLG-Kontrollstellen-Zulassungsverordnung”.  
6.5 Outlook  
Organic controls are considered a prerequisite for the existence of organic markets. 
Currently, any technological or societal change that could supersede organic control in its 
actual shape seems far away: The technological development of procedures to 
authenticate organic food on the product2, e.g., based on laboratory analyses, is at most in 
its infancy. A societal (e.g., by legislation) or demand change allowing or demanding 
only organic production methods could also supersede organic control, but is unrealistic 
at present. Therefore, the further development of organic control systems is the current 
challenge.  
A report on effective inspection and enforcement in UK stated: “Risk assessment […] is 
not implemented as thoroughly and comprehensively as it should be” (Hampton, 2005). 
Presumably, this general statement on risk assessment applies for organic certification 
systems, too. The use of further developed econometric models for risk based control 
approaches implies potential advantages. Such a quantitative approach can positively 
complement the qualitative risk assessments currently applied. Potential advantages are 
the simultaneous analysis of different risk factors at once, the option to perform the 
analysis based on current data to capture seasonal effects, and the impartiality of the 
method.  
Future corresponding analyses should specifically focus on the determinants of severe 
non-compliances jeopardizing organic integrity mostly. The rare occurrence of severe 
non-compliances requires much larger datasets. Such datasets are also needed to further 
investigate the potential biases discussed in chapter 6.1. The analysis of longer time series 
could allow capturing dynamic effects, e.g., how operators react to different control 
strategies and sanction behaviour. Then, count data models could also be a viable 
alternative opening up further opportunities.  
                                                 
2  This implies a rigorous change regarding the costs of quality information of organic food products. The 
existence of a corresponding affordable technology could lower information costs and uncertainty. This 
would mean that the process quality “organic” became a product quality.  
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If the application of such a quantitative risk analysis is adequately considered in the data 
selection and collection process of control bodies, this can improve risk based control 
systems. The application however requires considerable technical and methodological 
expertise and is far from being implemented in a standardized way in control data bases.  
The evolution of data handling and software development (e.g., the spread of open-source 
software) could offer opportunities for the practical implementation of sophisticated risk 
based control systems. Major certification systems with a central database and large 
number of operators would present a good testing field for the further development. But 
even in the fragmented German control sector, it could be possible to develop and to 
implement an open-source database used conjointly by different control bodies. The 
open-source situation would allow sharing development costs and integrating expert 
knowledge on data handling and data analysis.  
This thesis focuses on details of organic controls. Such controls however need to be 
communicated or signalled credibly to consumers. Consumers generally do not know the 
details of standards and the control system (Janssen and Hamm, 2011), but consumers 
trust or distrust individual labels. Different stakeholders of the organic control system 
such as control bodies or the competent authorities could partly alleviate this information 
gap. A possible approach could be that control bodies publish their control efforts and 
results yearly (cf. e.g., Rundgren (2009)) to make the control system more transparent. 
Such transparency could contribute to establish a reputation system (Jahn et al., 2005) for 
organic controls. Such measures could easily and at low cost be implemented by different 
actors in the control system.  
Standards fulfil important functions in our economic life. This thesis sheds light on 
relevant aspects of control systems that shall assure the adherence to standards. This 
research focuses on the organic food market and illustrates the relevance of supervision 
and the further development of risk based control approaches. However, the approach 
presented, the methods applied, and the findings are also relevant for other food control 
systems in general.  
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